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Equity andthe Article I Court

"Relieve the judges from the rigour of text law, and permit
them, with pretorian discretion, to wander into it's equity, and
the whole legal system becomes incertain."**
"Tax law is not based on equity and arguments of equity have
little force. .**.
I. INTRODUCTION

To most lawyers, the "federal courts" are the courts created under
Article III of the United States Constitution. However, the federal courts also
include the United States Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims,
the bankruptcy courts, and the territorial courts - all "legislative courts" created
by Congress under Article I of the Constitution. Several of these Article I courts
have important jurisdiction and large dockets, and issue influential opinions
with precedential value.2 Yet, scholars typically have not paid much attention
to legislative courts other than the bankruptcy courts, which are courts adjunct
to the Article III district courts. Since 1988, when Professor Richard Fallon of
Harvard Law School published his important article, "Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III," little has been published on the
features and limitations of Article I courts.

** Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 28,1785), in 9 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 71 (J. Boyd ed. 1954) (original spelling retained).
*** Polos v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 929, 932 (1982) (citing Commissioner v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977)).
1. See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: the Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Courts, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 909, 910 (1990) ("the words 'the federal courts' and 'the federal
judiciary' are still commonly used to refer to that set ofjudges who have life tenure ('Article III
judges'), but the equation is imprecise. 'The federal courts' are also populated by other 'federal
judges' - who work within the judicial branch but who are creatures of congressional
legislation.").
2. The United States Tax Court (Tax Court) is an example. The Tax Court is a national
court that sits in numerous cities nationwide, and has a multi-billion dollar docket. In fiscal year
1999, for example, $32.8 billion were in dispute in pending Tax Court cases. By contrast, $2.7
billion were in dispute in tax cases in the Court of Federal Claims, and $2.6 billion were in
dispute in tax cases in the District Courts. American Bar Association Tax Section Court
Procedure Committee. January 2001 Report of Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service, at 2 [hereinafter, Report to ABA].
Tax Court cases are often cited by Article III courts. See, e.g., GE v. Commissioner,
245 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing, among other Tax Court cases, Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995); Sim-Air, USA, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 187,
192 (1992)); Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (citing,
among others, Quirk v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 709 (1950), aft'd, 196 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1952);
Holmesv. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 622,627 (1967); Estate of Steinv. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 275
(1963); Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. Memo (CCII) 1653 (1980)).
3. 101 Harv. L. Rev. 916 (1988).
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Perhaps legislative courts are overlooked because they have no clear
place in the study of constitutional law;4 it is Article III of the Constitution that
grants the judicial power of the United States to the United States Supreme
Court (Supreme Court) and inferior courts such as the United States Courts of
Appeals and the District Courts.' Yet Article I courts perforn the traditional
judicial function of resolving controversies by applying the law to the facts and
rendering an opinion. In fact, they resemble Article Im courts in most respects,
except that their judges lack the salary and tenure protections of Article II.6
Despite the superficial resemblance to Article III courts, Article I courts
lack other features key to judicial power. For example, Article III expressly
provides courts with jurisdiction in both law and equity; Article I does not
mention law or equity and does not even specifically grant Congress the power
to create any court. In 1938, the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure7 eliminated the distinction between law and equity in Article III
courts, but those rules do not apply in the United States Tax Court.8 Does the
Tax Court have equitable powers? Should it? Given the importance of the
Article I courts in adjudicating public rights,9 it is surprising how uncertain and
4. Cf. Eric Bruggink, A Modest Proposal, 28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 529, 542 (1999) (a
"consequence of being an Article I court is the lack of any clear location for the court in the
Government's organizational chart").
5. See U.S. Const. art. II. § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish .... ).
6. See id. ("The Judges, both ofthe supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 2, 18; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,539 (1970); John
R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American Judging, 34 Hous.
L. Rev. 1425, 1430 (1998). The Court of Federal Claims has arule similar to rule 2 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ct. Fed. C1. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as
a 'civil action."').
8. "The United States Tax Court is the paradigm of an Article I court and the
quintessential specialty court." Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence:
Can it be Without Article 111?, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 863, 869 (1995).
9. See Ex ParteBakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1929) ("Legislative courts...
maybe created as special tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between the
government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are
susceptible of it.... Conspicuous among such matters are claims against the United States. These
may arise in many ways and may be for money, lands or other things.").
In fiscal year 1999, for example, the Tax Court had a docket of approximately 21,900
cases, which was lower than in prior years. See Report to ABA, supra note 2, at 3. For the same
year, the District Courts had approximately 1,200 docketed tax cases, and the Court of Federal
Claims had approximately 700. See Report to ABA, supra note 2, at3. District Court suits include
cases over which the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction, such as certain types of excise tax
cases.
The District Courts generally receive more tax filings than the Court of Federal Claims.
For example, during the years 1975 through 1984, the Tax Court received 95.58% of tax cases
filed, the Court of Federal Claims 0.076%, and the District Courts 3.65%. See Charles E.
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unclear the limits on their power are.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Tax Court's
predecessor court lacked equitable powers.1l That could end the inquiry. Yet,
the Tax Court increasingly has used equitable doctrines in deciding cases in
ways contrary to the result indicated by a straightforward application of
applicable statutes.11 Public choice theory teaches that judges may seek to
maximize their power by expanding thejurisdiction of their courts and through
decisions that go beyond the governing statutes.' 2 The Tax Court's application
of equity reflects both of these tendencies.
To elucidate the limits Article I ofthe Constitution places on legislative
courts, this article considers the question of the extent, if any, of the equitable
powers of the Tax Court under Article I. Part I ofthe article considers generally
the role of Article I courts in the federal system, and the constitutional limits
on that role. Next, Part I traces the Tax Court's evolution into an Article I court.

Boynton IV & Jack Robison, Choosing District Court overTax Court: Some Case Characteristics,
36 Tax Notes 807, 808 Table 1 (1987). In fiscal year 1999, approximately 20.400 of 20.799
federal tax cases (98.08%) were filed in Tax Court. See Report to ABA, supra note 2,at 8.22.
In general, the comparison of the number of Tax Court cases to refund court tax cases was
starkest during the tax shelter era because of the particularly high volume of Tax Court case
filings. See infra note 46.
10. See Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943) (Board
of Tax Appeals, predecessor ofthe Tax Court, hadno equityjurisdiction); see also Commissioner
v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) ("mI]he Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks
general equitable powers."). There is an argument that "general equitable powers" differ from
application of equitable principles. For a discussion of the distinction, see infra text
accompanying note 131.
11. See, e.g., Estate ofMueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 553 (1993) (applying
equitable recoupment); Orenstein v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000) (same);
Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. Memo (CCH) 86, T.C. Memo (RIA) 88,049 (1988)
(applying equitable estoppel); see also Bachner v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 125, 131 n.7 (1997)
("In a Tax Court proceeding, either party is free to raise equity-based defenses to the assertions
of the other party, and the Court, insofar as it has jurisdiction over the main claim, is free to
entertain those defenses.").
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not stemmed the equity tide; in fact, in one
recent instance the IRS immediatelyreversed itself, acquiescing in an apparentreach for equitable
power by the Tax Court. See infra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
12. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 51 (1991) ("Rather than trying to protect
their powerjudges might be trying to maximize it, another approach related to the public choice
analysis of administrators. If one imagines this as an effort to expandjudicial jurisdiction, one is
left with effects that are as occasional and as marginal as the power-protection hypothesis.
Alternatively, judges could be trying to expand their power through their substantive rulings.
Under this theory, judges would ignore statutory language whenever possible or frame rules of
construction that permitted them to ignore this language. There is some empirical support for this
hypothesis.") (footnote omitted); see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing EverybodyElse Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 2 (1993); William
Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& Econ., 875, 885-87 (1975).
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Part II considers the meaning and scope of the terms "equity" and
"equitable powers," providing both a brief history of the development of equity
in England and America, and an analysis of the distinction between "law" and
"equity." This part also considers the use of equity in Article I courts. In
particular, it considers the Tax Court's use of equity, focusing on the doctrines
of equitable recoupment and estoppel, and statutory equitable relief fromjoint
and several tax liability for an "innocent" spouse.
Part III combines the analyses of Article I courts and equity, focusing
on the Tax Court. This part considers the argument made by some tax lawyers
that because outcomes in the Tax Court should be the same as outcomes in
similar cases in the Article III district courts, the Tax Court must have equitable
powers. Next, it examines possible sources of equitable power for the Tax
Court, including applicable statutes and the possible equity-like ancestry of Tax
Court overpayment claims.
The article concludes that Article I courts have limited sources of
equitable power, and that even Article I courts granted equitable powers by
Congress must be alert to possible derogation of the judicial power of Article
II. Given those constraints, the Tax Court's tendency to apply equitable
doctrines when necessary to avoid harsh outcomes dictated by statute lacks
constitutional authority. For the Tax Court to apply equitable principles as it
has been doing, Congress will need to take appropriate action - within
constitutional limits - to broaden or redefine the jurisdiction of the court.
II. THE ROLE AND POWERS OF ARTICLE I COURTS
A. The ConstitutionalRole ofLegislative Courts
The current federal court system consists of both Article I and Article
Ed courts. Article III of the United States Constitution sets forth the general
outline of federal judicial power:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.... The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made . . . under their Authority; [and] . . . to
'13
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.

13. U.S. Const. art. M. §§ 1, 2, cl. 2.
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Courts such as the federal district courts and the Courts of Appeals are
established by Congress under that power.14 Other courts, including the Tax
Court, are created using Congress' power under Article I of the Constitution."
Article I courts are created by Congress under its powers enumerated in, and
the "necessary and proper" clause of, Article I." Article I courts differ from
Article IlI courts in that they are not subject to the restrictions of Article 1H.
That is, Article I judges need not have life tenure,16 and their pay may be
diminished.17 Article I courts are also not subject to the "case or controversy"
limitation in Article rn.' s Thus, Article I courts constitutionally may give
advisory opinions to Congress. 9
The well-known constitutional doctrine of "separation of powers"
separates and balances the roles of the Article I legislature, Article II executive
branch, and Article rn judiciary. A branch of government violates separation
of powers if it either assumes power of another branch or gives away too much
21
of its own power.20 Given the seemingly mandatory language of Article fIH,
14. U.S. Const. art. II. § 1.

15. See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article II:
Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 85, 127 (1988) ("the
Court has viewed [the] power [to create non-Article rM courts] as premised on Congress's power
under Article I's 'necessary and proper clause' power to implement its enumerated powers.")
(footnote omitted); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the
NorthernPipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 197, 198 ("Congress will usually employ one of its
enumerated powers in Article I, in combination with the 'necessary-and-proper' clause of that
same Article.").
16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 181-82 (Little Brown & Co. 1989);
Resnik, supra note 1, at 912 (In short, 'the federal courts' include many 'judges' who lack life
tenure."). Tax Court judges, for example, serve fifteen-year terms. See IRC § 7443(e).
17. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 181-82; Resnik, supra note 1, at 910-911, cf.
Bums, Stix Friedman & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 395 (1971), ("Did the
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 so change the status and function of the Tax Court that
it is now exercising the 'judicial powers' referred to in Article III and must be established as an
Article Im court with its judges having the tenure and compensation protection provided in
section 1 of Article III? We think not.").
18. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
Allow Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221, 248 (1999); U.S.
Const. art. III. § 2, cl.1.
19. See DonaldD. Haber, The DeclaratoryPowers ofBankruptcy Courts to Determine

the Federal Tax Consequences of Chapter 11 Plans, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 407,426 (1995).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Claims was an Article III Court although
it had the power to render advisory opinions. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 586-87
(1962); (Clark, J., concurring). The Tax Court, however, does not have statutory jurisdiction to
give Congress advisory opinions.
20. See Glidden, at 605.

21. See U.S. Const. art. III. § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish") (emphasis added). The "inferior Courts" referred to in Article III are
Article M courts created by Congress under art. I § 8, cl. 9 (the "inferior tribunals" clause) not
Article I "legislative" courts.
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Article I courts are an odd creation. Their very existence appears to be prima
facie evidence of an infringement by the legislature on the judicial power
expressly granted to Article IIcourts. Nonetheless, despite the language of
Article Ed, Article I courts are so accepted today that commentators consider
a return to 'Article III literalism' virtually unthinkable. 22
The approval of Article I courts by the Supreme Court may be traced
back to the 1800s. In 1828, the Supreme Court upheld territorial courts created
under Article 123 and, even earlier, in Marbury v. Madison, recognized the right
of William Marbury to his commission for a five-year term as a Justice of the
Peace in the District of Columbia, thereby apparently allowing the exercise of
judicial power without the lifetime tenure required by Article 1ll.24 Since then,
the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Article I courts such as
the Superior Court and Court of Appeals for District of Columbia;- the
predecessor of the current Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Claims;2 the
now-defunct Court of Customs Appeals; 27 the territorial courts; 2 and,29 by
implication, the predecessor to the Tax Court, the Board of Tax Appeals.
Nonetheless, Article I courts have not experienced entirely smooth
sailing.3" In NorthernPipelinev. MarathonPipeLine Co.,3 the Supreme Court
22. M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review-ANice Thing? Article fIf, Separation ofPowers
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,29 Conn. L. Rev.
1525. 1550 (1997) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Fallon, supra note 3, at 938).
23. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828), Fallon, supra note 3, at 916.
24. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 451 (1989); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162
(1803).
25. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
26. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
27. See Ex ParteBakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
28. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
Historically, Supreme Court case law confined Congress' power to create Article I
courts to certain areas. Article I courts that fall in the following four categories have been held
constitutionally permissible: "(1) for United States possessions and territories, (2) for military
matters, (3) for civil disputes between the United States and private citizens, and (4) for criminal
matters or for disputes between private citizens where the legislative court serves as an adjunct
to an Article Ill court that can review the legislative court's decisions." Chemerinsky, supra note
16, at 184.
29. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589,599-601 (1931) (review byBoard of Tax
Appeals is constitutionally adequate); cf. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S 868, 873 (1991)
(upholding constitutionality of Tax Court's use of special trial judges appointed by the Chief
Judge ofthe Tax Court). Lower courts have held the Tax Court Constitutional. See, e.g., Shenker
v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109, 114 n.6 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1068 (1987);
Knoblauch v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830
(1985); Sparrow v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 914, 915 (4th Cir. 1984); Redhouse v.
Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
30. See Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by
the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 Cornell L.
Rev. 985, 1002 (1991) (discussing NorthernPipeline decision).
31. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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held unconstitutional a prior incarnation of the bankruptcy courts.3 - After
NorthernPipeline,in determining the constitutionality of an Article I court, the
Court has balanced the desirability of an Article I court against the degree of
encroachment on the Article Ijudiciary.33 "Among the factors upon which we
have focused are... the extent to which the non-Article Ill forum exercises the
range ofjurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article IllI courts, the
origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article Il."34
B. The Tax Court as an Article I Court
The Tax Court became a legislative court under Article I of the
Constitution35 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.36 Prior to 1969, the Tax
Court was an executive agency, originally named the Board of Tax Appeals
(Board). The Board was created in 1924."7 Initially, there was no appeal from
a Board of Tax Appeals decision. However, the losing party could file a lawsuit
"where the findings of the Board would be taken asprimafacieevidence of the
facts."3 In 1926, Congress made decisions from the Board directly appealable
to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.39
In 1942, Congress changed the Board's name to the Tax Court of the
United States, 4° but it was not until 1969 that the Tax Court officially became
a court.4' The process by which the Tax Court became an Article I court was
almost an accident of the periodic struggle of various parties between 1943 and
1969 to obtain judicial status, and particularly Article I status, for the Board
of Tax Appeals.4 2
As chances for achieving article I1 status for the Tax Court
became increasingly bleak, Congressman Mills submitted an
alternative bill in 1969 providing for legislative court status
32. See NorthernPipeline,458 U.S. 50 (1982).
33. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Thomasv. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,473 U.S. 568 (1985); see also Susan BlockLieb, The Costs of a Non-Article IlBankruptcy Court System, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 529, 537-38
(1998) (citing Chemerinsky, supra note 16 at § 4.5.4 (1994)).
34. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted).
35. See IRC § 7441; Freytag,501 U.S. at 887 (In 1969, Congress expressly made the
Tax Court an Article I court rather than an executive agency).
36. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730.
37. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336.
38. Geier, supra note 30, at 990 (citing RevenueAct of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat.
337).
39. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001(a), 1002, 44 Stat. 9, 109-10.
40. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798.
41. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
42. See Geier, supra note 30, at 991-993.
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under article I. No public hearings were held on the subject,
and the provisions of the bill "were quietly inserted into the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 by the Senate Finance Committee in
executive session," becoming law on December 30, 1969. 43
The Tax Court has remained an Article I court ever since.
The Tax Court's primary function since its inception as the Board of
Tax Appeals has been to provide taxpayers an opportunity to litigate tax
disputes with the IRS without paying the disputed amount first.44 Although the
Tax Court has jurisdiction over a multitude of types of claims, 45 the bulk of its
43. Id. at 993 (footnote omitted) (quoting Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court:
An Historical Analysis 214 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1979)).
44. See Appeal of Everett Knitting Works, 1 B.T.A. 5. 6 (1924) ("The Board was
created to give the taxpayer a chance to have an open and neutral consideration of his liability for
a deficiency before he is required to pay. The harsh rule ofpayment first and litigation afterwards
was sought to be mitigated."): Hoffman & Cihlar, supranote 8, at 869 ("The purpose ofthe Board
[of Tax Appeals] was to ensure that in most cases a taxpayer could obtain an independent review
of a tax deficiency determination before the tax was assessed."): Leo P. Martinez, The Summons
Power and Tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 731,742 (1994) ("The
United States Tax Court was established to provide taxpayers with a forum for informal and
inexpensive adjudication ofpurportedtax payment deficiencies."); cf. Flora v. United States, 357
U.S. 63, 75 (1958) ("It is suggested that a part-payment remedy is necessary for the benefit of a
taxpayer too poor to pay the full amount of the tax. Such an individual is free to litigate in the Tax
Court without any advance payment.").
45. Tax Court jurisdiction extends to (1) tax deficiency cases; (2) overpayment claims
incidental to its deficiency jurisdiction; (3) certain actions for attorney's fees, (4) declaratory
judgment actions in specific types of cases; (5) proceedings for determination of employment
status, (6) certain actions for disclosure of IRS written determinations; (7) innocent spouse
claims; (8) collection due process claims; (9) adjustments of partnership items; and (10) IRS
denial of requests for abatement of interest. See IRC §§ 6213(a) ("Within 90 days, or 150 days
if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency
authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a
redetermination ofthe deficiency."), 6214(a) ("Except as provided by section 7463, the Tax Court
shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so
redetermined is greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the
taxpayer, and to determine whether any additional amount, or any addition to the tax should be
assessed, if claim therefor is asserted by the Secretary at or before the hearing or a rehearing."),
6512(b)(1) ("Except as provided by paragraph (3) and by section 7463, ifthe Tax Court finds that
there is no deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of... tax...
in respect of which the Secretary determined the deficiency, or finds that there is a deficiency but
that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to
determine the amount of such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the decision of the Tax
Court has become final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer."), 7430 (awards of administrative
and litigation costs and fees), 7428 (declaratoryjudgments relating to status and classification of
organizations under § 501(c)(3), etc.), 7476 (declaratory judgments relating to qualification of
certain retirement plans), 7477 (declaratory judgments relating to value of certain gifts, 7478
(declaratory judgments relating to status of certain governmental obligations, 7479 (declaratory
judgments relating to eligibility of estate with respect to installment payments under § 6166),

2001]

Equity and the Article I Court

caseload consists of tax deficiency cases in which the IRS has mailed the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency (asserting an understatement of taxes) and the
taxpayer has filed a timely responsive petition.46 For the Tax Court to have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a deficiency case, the IRS must have
mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency for a particular tax period,4 7 and the
taxpayer must have filed a timely responsive petition.4 8 In general, the court's
jurisdiction extends only to the tax year(s) that are the subject of the notice of
deficiency and the petition.49 The Tax Court also has pendent jurisdiction over
the taxpayer's overpayment claims with respect to those tax years.5 0 These
deficiency cases could, alternatively, and at the option of the taxpayer, be
litigated in the Court of Federal Claims or the District Courts (the so-called
"refund fora"). 1 However, the refund fora, unlike the Tax Court, require
payment of the full amount in dispute before litigating.52

7436 (proceedings for determination of employment status), 6110(f) (resolution of disputes
relating to disclosure), 6015(e) (innocent spouse claims), 6330(d)(1)(A) (hearing before levy on
taxpayer property), 6226 (judicial review of final partnership administrative adjustments), and
6404(i) (review of IRS denial of taxpayer request for abatement of interest).
46. For example, as of September 30,2000, the Tax Court had a docket of 16,609 cases
in which a total over $28 billion were at stake, and only 37 declaratory judgment cases. See
Report to ABA, supra note 2, at 4.
The Tax Court's overall docket has shrunk as tax shelter cases have been resolved. In
1987, 42,623 cases were filed in Tax Court, while only 1,100 refund cases were filed in the
District Courts and Court of Federal Claims combined. See United States Tax Court, 1994 Fiscal
Year Statistical Information (1994); William F. Nelson & James J. Keightley, Managing the Tax
Court Inventory, 7 Va. Tax Rev. 451,453 (1988). After a slight increase from 1985 to 1986 in
the number of Tax Court cases filed (48,398 in fiscal year 1986), the number of cases filed
hovered around 30,000 from 1988 through 1993, dropping to 23,524 in fiscal year 1994. See
United States Tax Court, 1994 Fiscal Year Statistical Information (1994). The numbers continue
to drop. In 1998, approximately2l,400 caseswerefiled, andin 1999, approximately 13,700 were
filed. See Report to ABA, supra note 2, at 8.
47. See IRC § 6212.
48. See IRC § 6213.
49. See IRC § 6214(b) ("The Tax Court in redetermining a deficiency of income tax
for any taxable year or of gift tax for any calendar year or calendar quarter shall consider such
facts with relation to the taxes for other years or calendar quarters as maybe necessary correctly
to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the tax for any other year or calendar quarter has been overpaid or
underpaid."). The Tax Court's application of equitable recoupment in spite of this section is
discussed infra at Part Im(B)(2)(a).
50. See IRC § 6512(b).
51. A taxpayer who has received a notice of deficiency faces a choice of fora. He may
petition the Tax Court, generally within 90 days of the date on the notice. See IRC § 6213. He
also has the option of paying the deficiency and following the refund procedures that will afford
jurisdiction in the refund courts. Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, Tax Controversies:
Practice andProcedure 9 (MatthewBender & Co., Inc. 2000). Therefundprocedures requirethat
the taxpayer pay the tax and then claim a refund from the IRS. See IRC § 6511; Lederman &
Mazza, supra, at 10-11.
52. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 189 (1960).
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The Tax Court undoubtedly is constitutional under the Northern
Pipeline test.-3 It does not exercise all of the judicial powers of the federal
district courts, such as conducting jury trials and issuing writs of habeas
corpus.54 In fact, the Tax Court exercises a narrower, more specialized
jurisdiction 5 that is permitted because Congress has waived the federal
government's sovereign immunity with respect to the type of claims the court
adjudicates.
Nonetheless, the Tax Court, like all Article I courts, is subject to limits
to avoid unconstitutional usurpation of Article III powers. The Supreme Court
stated in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 6 that in ruling on
the constitutionality of an Article I court, one of the factors it considers is "the
extent to which the non-Article 1I forum exercises the range ofjurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article I courts . ...",Although this is only
one factor, and although the Court would be unlikely to find the Tax Court
unconstitutional, it could find its use of equity unconstitutional.
C. The Powers ofArticle I Courts
Supreme Court jurisprudence on Article I courts reflects the Court's
struggle to distinguish Article I from Article III courts. In one case, the Court
stated, "we think it proper to state that we do not consider congress can...
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.... At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible ofjudicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem
proper."5" Another case distinguished "public rights" suits, which may be
decided by Article I courts, from those that are "inherently judicial."59 In
53. Cf.Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. at 873 (upholding constitutionality of Tax
Court's use of special trial judges appointed by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court); Shenker v.
Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109, 114 n.6 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of Tax Court),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1068 (1987).
54. See Schor, 478 U.S., at 852-53 (1986) (finding that Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) does not exercise all powers of district courts, and citing as examples
CFTC's inability to conduct jury trials or issue writs of habeas corpus).
55. See id. at 852 (approving the CFTC as focusing on only a "particularized area of
law") (citingNorthern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 85); Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 8, at 869 ("The
United States Tax Court is the paradigm of an Article I court and the quintessential specialty
court.").

56. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
57. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
58. Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284

(1855).
59. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68
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general, public rights suits involve the government as a party." The case law
also indicates that because Article I courts are legislative courts subject to
Congress' statutory control, they are more limited in their powers than Article
lI courts.6 1

There seems to be little dispute that Article I courts can decide
constitutional questions, even without express statutory authority.6' Professor
Dubroffhas pointed out that the Tax Court cannot determine the correctness of
the IRS's assertion of a deficiency "by simply examining the tax statutes in a
vacuum." 63 In effect, this allows the legislative branch to decide the
constitutionality of its own statutes. This potentially broad power is constrained
by the accepted practice of resolving issues, if at all possible, on nonconstitutional grounds.'
Although it might seem that the power to decide constitutional
questions would indicate the power to use equity (as a sort of lesser included
power), in fact, these two powers are not related in this manner. The Board of
Tax Appeals, an executive agency, considered constitutional questions when
it faced them. 65 By contrast, in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator
Co., 66 the Supreme Court held that the Board of Tax Appeals had no equity
jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the jurisdiction of the Board was
expressly defined in the Code, and Congress had not granted the Board equity

(1982); see also William M. Millard, Note, Eroding the Separation of Powers: Congressional
Encroachment on Federal Judicial Power: CFTC v. Schor, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 669 (1987).
60. SeeNorthernPipelineConstr.Co., 458 U.S., at 69 (1982) (citingExparteBakelite

Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts
Improvement Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 385, 409 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam) ("The Tax
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers."); Chavez v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540, 547 (1989) ("[T]his court is an Article One court with very specific
jurisdiction granted by the congress. This legislative grant of equitable jurisdiction is to be strictly
construed."); In re Hessinger&Assocs., 192 B.R. 211,215 (Bankr. N.D. Ca. 1996) ("[B]ecause
the bankruptcy courts are creatures of Article I, they have no 'inherent' powers and their
jurisdiction is limited to that expressly granted by Congress.").
62. SeeHaroldDubroff, TheUnited States Tax Court: AnHistorical Analysis 214,47980 (Commerce ClearingHouse, Inc. 1979) (discussingTax Court'spower to decide constitutional
questions); see also Boyce v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,681 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[Tlhe Tax Court has jurisdiction over constitutional questions even though it is not an Article
III court."); Rager v. Commissioner, 775 F.2d 1081,1083 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Taxpayers argue that
because the Tax Court is not an Article III court, it cannot have jurisdiction over constitutional
questions. Taxpayers' argument is frivolous; we have often upheld Tax Court decisions which
were based on a constitutional inquiry.").
63. Dubroff, supra note 62, at 482.
64. See Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the
Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 85 (1995).
65. See Dubroff, supra note 62, at 480 (describing the Board of Tax Appeals'
consideration of constitutional questions, beginning as early as 1926).
66. 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
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jurisdiction.6 7 In effect, the power to decide the constitutionality of statutes has
been accepted as necessary to making decisions regarding those statutes.68 By
contrast, a court need not have the power to do equity in order to make
decisions about the application of statutes.
Eskridge and Frickey have cogently argued that the Supreme Court
draws on canons of statutory interpretation to advance constitutional values
such as separation of powers.69 The Court may use a variety of canons to avoid
a separation of powers violation, including avoidance of unnecessary
constitutional questions,7" a presumption against derogation of the judiciary's
inherent powers,71 a presumption against derogation of the President's
traditional executive powers,7 2 and the nondelegation doctrine that applies to
the legislature.73
The presumption against derogation of the inherent power of the
judiciary precludes another branch, such as the legislature, from infringing
upon the "judicial Power" granted to courts in Article I. For example, in Link
v. Wabash R. Co.,74 the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b),
which allows a defendant to move for involuntary dismissal of an action or
claim,7 5 did not limit a court's power to dismiss for failure to prosecute to
instances where a defendant moves for dismissal, but rather allowed a court to
dismiss the case sua sponte. Similarly, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,76 the
Court held that the courts have "inherent power" to discipline litigants,
including the imposition of attorney's fees, regardless of the particular terms
of statutes that provide for recovery of costs.77
The essential attributes ofthe "judicial Power" referenced in Article md
arguably consist of jurisdiction in cases at common law, in equity, and in
admiralty. Certainly the "inherent power" of the judicial branch includes the
power to do equity.78 Use of that power by another branch of government
67. See id. at 420.
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. See William N. Eskridge. Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
70. See Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the
Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 85 (1995).
71. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 69, at 605.
72. Id. at 606.
73. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000); Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 69. at 606.
74. 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962).
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
76. 447 U.S. 752. 764-67 (1980).
77. This example appears in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 69, at 605.
78. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397 (1946); Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 310 F.2d 513,516 (7th Cir. 1962). See also
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (inherent power of a federal court to enjoin threatened
or actual violation of constitutional rights); Robert Lincoln, Executive Decisionmaking by Local
Legislatures in Florida: Justice, Judicial Review and the Need for Legislative Reform, 25 Stetson
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therefore may infringe upon the power of the judicial branch. As with any
separation of powers issue, assertion by the legislative branch of equitable
powers raises the question of what the limits are before the assertion is an
unconstitutional derogation of the powers of the judiciary.
The use of canons of construction to advance constitutional values
would suggest that the jurisdiction of Article I courts should be narrowly
construed. Narrow construction of the jurisdiction of Article I courts is
consistent with avoidance of constitutional questions in that it avoids separation
of powers problems. Arguably, Article I courts constitutionally may consider
only statutory causes of action. This would suggest that, in the absence of
statutory authorization of equitable powers, an Article I court does not have
such powers.
Of course, sometimes statutes expressly authorize equitable
considerations or equitable causes of action, even in Article I courts like the
Tax Court. For example, the Tax Court has longstanding declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, and must weigh the equities in awarding an innocent spouse relief
fromjoint and several liability.79 Are those unconstitutional derogations of the
judicial power of Article I courts? The statutory grant of equitable power is
necessary but not sufficient under the constitution. The statute could be
unconstitutional on its face, or unconstitutional as applied in a particular case.
HI.THE ORIGINS OF EQUITY AND ITS USE IN ARTICLE I COURTS
A. A History of Equity
"In a broad jurisprudential sense, equity means the power to do justice
in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of strict
legal rules.""0 However, the modem use of the term "equity" with respect to
courts' jurisdiction and power reflects the historical development, first in
England and then in America, of two distinct judicial systems.8" A brief
L. Rev. 627,655 (1996) ("[F]undamental judicial powers generally involve issues for which the
right to a jury trial is protected, equitable powers, and the inherent judicial power to control
proceedings.").
79. See IRC § 6015(b), (e).
80. Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan
Experience, 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 609, 610 (1997) ("All writers on the subject of equity,
regardless of their philosophical persuasion, agree that the terms 'equity' and 'equitable' are
difficult to define.").
81. Prior to the distillation in two courts, the courts of law and the courts of equity,
there were multiple, competing venues. The common law courts were the Exchequer, Common
Pleas, and King's Bench. See Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the American Judiciary, 46
Ala. L. Rev. 763, 770 (1995). The ecclesiastic courts applied the canon law of the Catholic
Church. Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian
Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on The Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies,
26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 483, 517 (1997). The English Court of Chancery drew upon the practices of
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overview of the equity system is therefore in order.
1. The Development of Equity in England.-Historically,litigation in
England took place in a two-court system: "common law" or "law" courts, and
"Chancery" or "equity" courts. 2
By the early sixteenth century it was apparent that the common
law system was accompanied by a substantially different one
called equity. Equity was administered by the Chancellor, as
distinguished from the three central common law courts with
their common law judges.... The main staples of Chancery
jurisdiction became the broader and deeper reality behind
appearances, and the subtleties forbidden by the formalized
writ, such as fraud, mistake, and fiduciary relationships.8 3
Because common law courts awarded only after-the-fact money damages,
which did not provide appropriate relief in all cases, the court of Chancery
made available both preventive injunctive relief and nonemontary relief such
as specific performance. 84 "That this court was attempting to do 'equity,' that
is to accomplish justice, gave rise to the term 'equity' as the designation for the
system ofjurisprudence involved, and the court that dispensed it as a court of
85
equity.
Equity is probably noted most for its remedies. Injunctions and specific
performance are the classic equitable remedies.86 Other equitable remedies
include rescission and reformation of contracts, and imposition of constructive
trusts.87 In fact, equity consisted of several additional elements that
distinguished it from law: its pleading practice," including its causes of action"
the ecclesiastical courts. See Moser, supra, at 485-486; Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval
English Court of Chancery, 14 Law & Hist. Rev. 245, 256-257 (1996).
82. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Pro cedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909,914 (1987). "Lawyers well into
the nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic viewed the 'common law' procedural system
as comprising the writ or form of action, the jury, and the technical pleading requirements that
attempted to reduce cases to a single issue." Id. at 917. Previously, there were multiple,
competing courts. See supra note 81.
83. Id. at 918 (footnotes omitted).
84. See Kennedy, supra note 80, at 612.
85. Id.
86. See Kennedy, supra note 80, at 627 ("Equitable remedies can be divided into two
kinds: coercive and restitutionary. Coercive, or injunctive, remedies are the most common.").
87. See The Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of
Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 275, 281 (1999).
88. See Kroger, supra note 7, at 1433.
89. Moser, supra note 81, at 484 (footnote omitted). Historically, certain causes of
action, such as accountings and novel disseisin,were cognizable only in equity courts. See, e.g.,
Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed
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and defenses,9" and its system of discovery.9 Furthermore, actions in equity
also generally were not triable by jury,92 and "certain forms of property, such
as mortgages and trusts, were recognized only in equity courts."'93
Equity developed maxims that limited its application to those cases in
which it was thought justice could be done through equity. Those maxims
include, "equity does not suffer wrong to be without a remedy"9 and "he who
seeks equity must do equity."95 In addition, equitable relief was available only
in equity courts,96 and only when there was no adequate remedy at law.97
Furthermore, equitable defenses were appropriately raised in response to
equitable claims, not claims at law.9" Equitable defenses include laches,
equitable recoupment, and equitable estoppel. Laches is an equitable defense
that refers to the staleness of a claim,' serving a role similar to that of a statute
of limitations, which generally did not exist in equity.' For example, in tax
Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 Hastings L.J. 729,732 (1987) ("The class action originated
in the English courts of chancery with the 'bill of peace.' A creature of equity, the bill of peace
allowed a representative of a group of similarly injured persons to bring suit on behalf of absent
class members as well as herself."). See also Subrin, supra note 82, at 915 ("The writ of novel
disseisin ...was designed to provide for the rapid ejection of one who was wrongfully on the
plaintiff's land.").
90. Equitable defenses include laches, see Kennedy, supra note 80, at 622 ("Along with
the unclean hands doctrine ...laches is the chief defense to equitable claims brought by a
plaintiff who has unreasonably delayed his claim."); unclean hands, George Keeton, An
Introduction to Equity 112 (6th ed. 1965) ("He wio comes into equity must come with clean
hands."); equitable estoppel, see JohnM. Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar
Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1321 (1935); and equitable recoupment,
see id.
91. See Kroger, supra note 7, at 1433.
92. See Subrin, supra note 82, at 920.
93. See Kroger, supra note 7, at 1433.
94. Keeton, supra note 90, at 89.
95. Id. at 87-117. "This maxim... is designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant... ." Kennedy, supra note 80, at 618.
96. Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article II and the Seventh Amendment, 77
N.C. L. Rev. 1037, 1041 n.15 (1999) ("Courts oflaw, whosejurisdiction was limited to common
law writs, could never hear and decide equitable matters.") (citing S.F.C. Milsom, Historical
Foundations of the Common Law 33-36 (2d ed. 1981)).
97. Krieger, supra note 87, at 279. This is no longer true in practice. See Douglas
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule,103 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1990).
98. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,244-45 n.16
(1985) ("[A]pplication of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel
indeed."); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 2A(2), at 94 (2d ed. 1993) ("Discretion to deny
legal reliefwouldmean that the judge might refuse to permit recovery ofpersonal injury damages
to a pedestrian struck down in a crosswalk on the ground that she was on her way to an illicit
rendezvous and would not have been injured had she stayed home with her family."); Martin
Kasten, Summons at 1600: Clintonv. Jones'Impacton the American Presidency, 51 Ark. L. Rev.
551, 568 (1998) ("Equitable defenses, such as laches, are not available in a case at law.").
99. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 840 (1980).
100. See Ashraf Ray Ibrahim, Note, The Doctrine of Laches in International Law, 83
Va. L. Rev. 647, 647 (1997) ("Unlike statutes of limitations, which are legislatively created and
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cases, a taxpayer might assert the defense when the IRS took unusually long in
pursuing the case.'
2. Equity in the United States.-The American colonies generally
distinguished between law and equity.0 2 In the United States, the same court
often sat in both law and equity, even before the merger of law and equity in
1938.03 When a federal court sat in law, juries were used, and in common law
actions, federal courts applied state law."° When a federal court sat in equity,
a judge decided the case, applying the precedents of the English Chancery
court, except as modified by any equity rules promulgated by the Supreme
05
Court.

1

The language of Article III ofthe Constitution reflects the then-existing
separation of law and equity, stating, in part, "The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ... ."1"6
When the framers of the Constitution began to design a system
of national courts, they naturally used the English model. The
federal courts were to be units of government that exercised
"judicial Power," one of the component parts of sovereign
authority. They could exercise that power in common law,
equity, and admiralty/maritime. .

.

. Although generally

deferring to common law's interpretation of substantive rights,
federal equity would, like its English predecessor, provide
relief from the rigidity of common law by exercising discretion
in procedure and remedies.0 7
The Judiciary Act of 178 9 granted the federal circuit courts jurisdiction
over "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" between citizens of
different states 0 8 but denied equity jurisdiction where there was a complete and
adequate remedy at law.' 9 At the time the Judiciary Act was enacted, there was
mechanically applied in courts of law, the doctrine of laches developed as an affirmative defense
in courts of equity- historically outside the statute of limitations' purview.").
101. See, e.g., Mecom v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 374, 391 (1993); Tregre v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) 3,098, T.C. Memo (RIA) 96,243 (1996).
102. Kroger, supra note 7, at 1438. ("By the time of the Constitutional Convention in
1787, all thirteen states had, at one time or another, granted their courts or governors equity
powers.") Id.
103. See Krieger, supra note 87, at 280.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. U.S. Const. art. Im. § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
107. John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 La. L. Rev. 173, 210-11 (1999).
108. 1 Stat. 78 (1789) (quoted in Naomi R. Calm, Family Law, Federalism, and the
Federal Courts, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 1073, 1087-88 (1994)).
109. 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789) (quoted in Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 443 (E.D. Pa.
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substantial disagreement as to whether equity focused on judicial discretion
without reference to precedence (the traditional view) or instead was subject
to specific procedures and stare decisis (the view of reformers).1 1 It was not
until after the year 1800 that the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall,
began to depart from the traditional view of equity."'
Over time, the Supreme Court began to "blur the lines between law and
equity" by importing various legal doctrines, such as stare decisis, into
equity. 12 In 1938, law and equity were merged in the federal courts through the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.113 Generally speaking, as a
result ofthe merger, "in civil matters before the district court... the distinction
between law and equity is now limited to the type of remedy imposed and the
' In addition, the use of equitable defenses is no
parties' right to a jury trial."114
longer limited to equitable claims.11
B. Equity in Article I Courts
1. In General.-Article I courts are a heterogeneous group. 1 6 The
bankruptcy courts are commonly termed "courts of equity,' 17 although the
appellation is misleading. 1 ' Congress has expressly granted the Court of
Federal Claims certain equitable powers, 1 9 and the Tax Court, though lacking
at least "general equityjurisdiction," routinely applies equitable principles. Yet,
despite their heterogeneity, all Article I courts are creatures of statute.
1831)). This provision "prevent[ed] encroachment upon the common-law right to jury trial
inasmuch as the Seventh Amendment had not been adopted at that time." 2 J. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice 2.05[1] (2d ed. 1989). This is not surprising because the Seventh Amendment
was under consideration by Congress at the time the Judiciary Act passed. Charles Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 54 (1923).
110. Kroger, supra note 7, at 1433.
111. Id. at 1446.
112. Kroger, supra note 7, at 1452-1453.
113. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970); Fed. R. Civ. P. 2.
114. Krieger, supra note 87, at 281.
115. SeeEdwardYorio, ADefense ofEquitable Defenses, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1201,1205
(1990).
116. Such diverse courts as the Territorial Courts, Military Courts Martial, and the
courts for the District of Columbia are all Article I courts. See Ron Weiss, Contempt Power of
the Bankruptcy Court, 6 Bank. Dev. J. 205, 239 (1989).
117. SeeKrieger, supranote 87, at 276 n.1 ("In the author's experience, the frequency
of reference to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity is second only to introductions, 'May it
please the Court' or 'Good morning (afternoon), Your Honor."').
118. See id. at 292 ("neither bankruptcy lawnor bankruptcy courts can claim roots in
English courts of equity. Bankruptcy remedies and insolvencyrights have always been a product
of legislative enactment rather than case-by-case determination in common law or equity
courts."); id. at 309 ("bankruptcy courts apply a statutory scheme rather than equitable maxims").
In the United States, bankruptcy is a statutory creation. Bankruptcy courts are courts of "equity"
in the fairness sense, rather than in the chancery sense.
119. See infra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Ct. Fed. Cl. 2, 8(e)(2).
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Article III courts have equitable power because it is specifically
authorized by Article III itself and granted to these courts by Congress.1 2°
Article I does not contain similar language.1 2' Simply being a "court" should
not confer equitable power because, constitutionally, there is a difference
between constitutional courts that exercise power granted by Article I of the
Constitution and legislative courts that may only exercise power expressly
conferred by Congress.
Nonetheless, Congress has authorized certain Article I courts to apply
equitable principles in certain situations. For example, since 1982, the Court of
Federal Claims, an Article I court, has had the power to grant equitable relief
in contract actions.122 Similarly, the Tax Court has declaratoryjudgment power
in a narrow set of cases. 123 However, power to grant an equitable remedy, such
as an injunction or a declaratory judgment, is still circumscribed by statute.
In general, any equitable power an Article I court exercises finds its
source in a statute. The statute defining a court's jurisdiction may specifically
authorize the application of equitable relief as is true for the Court of Federal
Claims.12 1 Specific statutory provisions that the court is charged with applying
may also authorize the use of equity. For example, certain Internal Revenue
2
Code provisions expressly bring equitable principles into the analysis.1
In addition to true equitable power, Article I courts may use equitable
considerations where that is provided by statute. In such instances, the use of
the term "equity" may be a definitional shorthand rather than a true grant of
equitable power. In other words, Congress may use the terms "equity" or
"equitable" to refer to the types of fairness considerations that are part of the
jurisprudence of equity, without actually conferring equitable powers by doing
27
126
so. For example, as discussed below, general innocent spouse relieft
120. See U.S. Const. art. III. § 2, cl. 1("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution .... ).
121. See Cross, supranote 107, at 201 ("Congress cannot delegate authorityit does not
have. None of Congress's enumerated powers, even when augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause, are broad enough to cover the entire set of substantive rules that comprise the law
of equity.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 218 ("Congress exercises the legislative power, not the

judicial.").
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1996) ("To afford
complete relief on any contract claim brought before the contract is awarded, the court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to grant declaratoryjudgments and such equitable and extraordinary relief
as it deems proper, including but not limited to injunctive relief. In exercising this jurisdiction,
the court shall give due regard to the interests of national defense and national security.");
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, P.L. 104-320, § 12(a), 110 Stat. 3875; The
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133, 96 Stat. 25, 41.
123. See supra note 45.
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1996).
125. See, e.g., IRC §§ 6015(b) (equity of awarding innocent spouse relief from joint
and several liability), 651 (h) (equitable tolling of statute of limitations on refund claims).
126. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
127. The innocent spouse defense allows an exception in certain cases from the rule of
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includes a provision requiring that "taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other individual liable for the
deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such understatement
.... "128 That use of the word "inequitable" likely refers to factors in
determining the "fairness" of innocent spouse relief. This distinction does not
affect the Tax Court's statutory power to decide the innocentspouse claim, but
129
it may affect the Tax Court's power to consider equitable defenses.
An analogous situation may occur with respect to claims with an
equitable heritage. That is, Congress' grant to an Article I court ofjurisdiction
over an equity-based cause of action probably carries with it the power to
consider related equitable defenses. On the other hand, if an action has
equitable aspects only in the sense that it has a fairness-based history, that need
not bring with it the power to hear equity-based defenses. For example, tax
refund claims are heard both by the federal district courts, which are Article HI
courts, and the Court of Federal Claims, which is an Article I court. 3 °
Numerous decisions by these courts state that the current refund suit derives
from the action for indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. As
discussedbelow, that action is infusedwith equity-type faimess considerations.
Yet that may not mean that the Court of Federal Claims can apply equitable
recoupment or equitable estoppel in tax refund cases.
Similarly, in current legal practice, "general equitable powers," such
as the power "to takejurisdiction over a matter not provided for by statute" may
be distinguishable from the power to apply "equitable principles" such as

joint and several liability of spouses filing ajoint tax return. See IRC §§ 6013(d)(3) ("if ajoint
return is made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect
to the tax shall be joint and several."), 6015 (providing for innocent spouse relief).
128. IRC § 6015(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 523, 532 (2d Cir. 1995) (with
respect to equity element, "[r]elevant factors include significant benefits received as a result of
the understatements ofthe spouse claiming relief, anyparticipation in the wrongdoing on the part
of the 'innocent' spouse, and the effect of a subsequent divorce or separation.") (interpreting
Code section 6013(e)(1)(D)); Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1993)
(significant benefit in excess of normal support is a factor relevant to equity of granting innocent
spouse relief); see also Regs. § 1.6013-5(b) ("Whether it is inequitable to hold aperson liable for
the deficiency in tax ...is to be determined on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. In
making such a determination a factor to be considered is whether the person seeking relief
significantly benefitted, directly or indirectly, from the items omitted from gross income.
However, normal support is not a significant 'benefit' for purposes of this determination.").
130. The Court of Federal Claims has an Article III history. Its predecessor, the Court
of Claims, was an Article Ell court, with trial and appellate jurisdiction, until 1982. Stephen J.
Legatzke, Note, The Equitable Recoupment Doctrine in United States v. Dalm: Where's the
Equity?, 10 Va. TaxRev. 861,895 n.252 (1991). In1982, Congress createdthetrial-level Claims
Court under Article I. SeeFederal Courts ImprovementAct of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 105,
133, 139, 96 Stat., at 26-28, 39-41, 42-44. At that time, Congress also renamed the court the
United States Claims Court. See id.
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equitable estoppel.' For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the
Court of Claims has no power to grant equitable relief."' 3 2 Subsequently,
Congress provided the court with jurisdiction to afford equitable relief,
including injunctive relief, in "any contract claim brought before the contract
is awarded."' 33 During the life of that provision, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Claims Court hadjurisdiction only to award damages, not specific equitable
relief, in a case involving review of the Department of Health and Human
Services' administration of Medicaid."' The Supreme Court stated, "The
Claims Court does not have the general equitable powers of a district court to
grant prospective relief."' 35 The Court acknowledged both its prior statement
that "the Court of Claims has no power to grant equitable relief' and Congress'
powers with respect to a different type of action
subsequent grant of equitable
36
than the one before it.'

The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court with respect to the Court
of Federal Claims is quite helpful in understanding the limits on the equitable
powers of Article I courts. Article I courts have no general equitable powers or
generalized ability to grant equitable relief purely from their existence as courts
of law. However, to the extent that Congress affords to an Article I court
jurisdiction over equitable causes of action or jurisdiction to grant equitable
relief, the court has those powers unless the grant unconstitutionally infringes
on Article Ill courts.
2. Equity in the Tax Court.-Ingeneral, the debate over the Tax Court's
equitable powers has taken place in specific contexts with respect to specific
equitable doctrines, most notably equitable recoupment and equitable
estoppel.' 37 In addition, and most recently, the Tax Court has asserted
jurisdiction over equitable innocent spouse relief despite statutory language that
does not seem to grant such jurisdiction. 3 '

131. Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1994).
132. Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465 (1973).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1996); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a), 110 Stat. 3875; The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133,96 Stat. 25,41 (1982). That provision was deleted and replaced
with a similar one in 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2000); Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a), 110
Stat. 3874 (Oct. 19, 1996).
134. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
135. Id. at 905; see also Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641,644-45 (Fed. Cir.1994) ("The
Court of Federal Claims is an Article I trial court of limited jurisdiction.... The remedies
available in that court extend only to those affording monetary relief, the court cannot entertain
claims for injunctive relief or specific performance, except in narrowly defined, statutorily
provided circumstances not here pertinent.") (citation omitted).
136. Boiven, 487 U.S., at 905 n.40 (1988).
137. See Dubroff, supra note 62, at 483-84.
138. See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
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a. The EquitableRecoupment Saga.----"[E]quitablerecoupment
allows a party to use a tax related claim, barred by the statute of limitations, as
a defense to another party's timely tax-related claim, where the two claims arise
out of the same transaction or taxable event."13' 9 It "is based upon the concept
that 'one taxable event should not be taxed twice, once on a correct theory and
once on an incorrect theory.. . and that to avoid this happening the statute of
140
limitations will be waived."",
The Tax Court's power to consider equitable recoupment arguments
has a long and winding history. Historically, the IRS took the position that it
141
was not entitled to offset a barred deficiency against a timely refund claim.
Its analysis was primarily statutory. 142 However, in Lewis v. Reynolds, 43 the
Supreme Court allowed the IRS to avoid issuing a refund when it found a
deficiency for the same tax year after the statute of limitations on assessment
had run. Shortly thereafter, in Bull v. UnitedStates,'" a tax refund action, the
Supreme Court recognized that although the taxpayer was the plaintiff,
functionally he was defending a claim made by the government,14 5 and allowed
him to use recoupment, thus modernizing the doctrine. 146 Yet, with respect to
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court stated in 1943:
The Internal Revenue Code, not general equitable principles,
is the mainspring of the Board's jurisdiction. Until Congress
deems it advisable to allow the Board to determine the
overpayment or underpayment in any taxable year other than
the one for which a deficiency has been assessed, the Board

139. James E. Tiemey, Equitable Recoupment Revisited: The Scope of the Doctrine
in Federal Tax Cases after United States v. Dalm, 80 Ky. L.J. 95, 101-02 (1991) (footnote
omitted).
Equitable recoupment issues may result because the party seeking recoupment has not
planned ahead to avoid the problem of a statute of limitations about to expire. See Burgess J.W.
Raby & William L. Raby, Equitable Recoupment- Maybe Not for Tax Court? 81 Tax Notes 87,
91 (1998) ("tax practitioners need to remember that the problem is caused by the statute of
limitations. The best cure is usually the protective refund claim. This works much better than
statute mitigation or equitable recoupment. File them early, file them often.").
140. Mann v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting
Minskoffv. United States, 490 F.2d 1283, 1285 (6th Cir. 1974)).
141. See, e.g., L.O. 1095, 1-1 C.B. 313 (1922).
142. Id. at 314.
143. 284 U.S. 281 (1933).
144. 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935) ("the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is
reversed in the field of taxation.").
145. See Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal
Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 183, 192-93 (1996).
146. JohnA. Lynch, Jr., Income Tax Statute ofLimitations: SixtyYears ofMitigationEnough, Already!!, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 62, 113-15 (1996).
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must remain impotent when the plea of equitable recoupment
is based upon an overpayment or underpayment in such other
year.

47

For years, Tax Court cases consistently expressed the view that the
court lacked jurisdiction over equitable recoupment claims.

148

In 1998,

Congress considered granting the Tax Court jurisdiction over a refund action
either related by subject matter to a pending deficiency action, or where the
result in either action would affect the amount in controversy in the other
action. 49 The provision included language providing that the Tax Court's
jurisdiction would "include any counterclaim, set-off, or equitable recoupment
against (or for) the taxpayer."' 50 That provision became part of the Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 19 88, but was deleted at conference without
explanation. 5'
[J]udicial application of equitable recoupment
historically evinces a strong desire to keep the equity genie in
the bottle because a genie who possesses equitable powers
threatens values dear to the law of taxation and, indeed, the
entire federal system. These threatened values include the
annual accounting principle, limitation of actions, and its
52
esteemed relative, sovereign immunity
One problem for the Tax Court is that, unlike with respect to equitable
estoppel, discussed below, there was and is a specific statutory barrier to the
Board/Tax Court's consideration of equitable recoupment.' 53 Code section
6214(b) provides that, in making an income tax or gift tax determination for a
particular year or calendar quarter, the Tax Court has "no jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the tax for any other year or calendar quarter has been
overpaid or underpaid."15 4 Arguably, that precludes equitable recoupment

147. Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418,422 (1943).
148. See e.g., Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 568, 570 (1989); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885, 888-890 (1989); Poinierv. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
478,490-491 (1986), aff'd, in part and rev'd, in part, 898 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988); Estate of Van
Winkle v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 994,999-1000 (1969); Vandenberge v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.

321,327-328 (1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1945); cf. Rev. Rul. 71-56, 1971-1 C.B. 404,
405 ("the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a plea of equitable recoupment").
149. See S.2238 § 785,100th Cong., 2d. Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S12344 (daily ed., Sept.

12, 1988).
150. Id.
151. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., 233-34 (1988).
152. Lynch, supra note 146, at 108 (footnote omitted).
153. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 274(g), 44 Stat. 56; Dubroff, supra note 62,
at 485.
154. IRC § 6214(b).
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involving income taxes and gift taxes.155 In 1999, Congress considered adding
a sentence to section 6214(b) that would grant the Tax Court equitable
recoupment power. The provision was part of the Taxpayer Refund and Relief
Act of 1999, which was vetoed by President Clinton.'5 6
In UnitedStates v. Dalm, the Supreme Court stated that because Dalm
had not raised the issue in her Tax Court petition, the Court had "no occasion
to pass upon the question whether Dalm could have raised a recoupment claim
in the Tax Court."' 57 In dissent, Justice Stevens echoed the majority's view that
it was possible that the Tax Court didhave equitable recoupmentjurisdiction. 55
Those statements provided an opening for the Tax Court to reconsider its power
to apply equitable recoupment.'5 9
In Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner (Mueller /),6' the Tax Court
considered only the question of whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction to apply
equitable recoupment. In Mueller I, the taxpayer-estate raised "the partial
affirmative defense of equitable recoupment" with respect to a time-barred
overpayment of income tax by the estate's residuary legatee, the Bessie I.
Mueller Trust (Trust). 6 ' Both the time-barred income tax overpayment and the
estate tax deficiency were based on the estate's valuation of stock in the
Mueller Company, which the IRS had contested." The IRS moved to dismiss
the defense for lack of jurisdiction. 63 The Tax Court held that it had
jurisdiction to consider the affirmative defense of equitable recoupment when
the defense is raised in a tax deficiency case over which it has jurisdiction."
The Court stated, "in deciding this case, we may take into account all facts that

155. The counter-argument is that § 6214(b) only precludes determination of prior
years' income taxes in income tax cases, and prior years' gift taxes in gift tax cases, and that it
does not apply if the two types of tax are different. This argument is based on the statute's use of
the phrase "the tax," which seemingly refers to the same tax under consideration, and on its
legislative history. For a discussion of the legislative history, see Estate of Bartels v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 430, 434 (1996).
156. H.R. 2448 § 1343, H.IL Conf. Rep. 106-289 at 194.
157. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 611 n.8 (1990).
158. See id.at 615 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 553 (1993).
160. Id. There was a prior decision in Mueller that focused on valuation ofMueller Co.
stock. See Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. Memo (CCH) 3,027, T.C. Memo (RIA)
92,284 (1992). That opinion is referred to by the courts as Mueller L See Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 107 T.C. 189, 191 (1996), af'd, on other grounds,153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1140 (1999); see also Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551,
551 (1993).
161. Estate of Mueller, 101 T.C. at 551.
162. See Estate ofMueller, 107 T.C. at 190. In MuellerI, the Tax Court held "that the
date-of-death value of the Mueller Co. stock was $1,700 per share, as opposed to $1,505 per
share as reported on petitioner's estate tax return or $2,150 as determined by respondent in the
notice of deficiency." Estate of Mueller, 107 T.C. at 191.
163. Estate ofMueller, 101 T.C. at 551.
164. Id. at 560.
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bear on petitioner's deficiency and may apply equitable principles in so
'
doing."165
Essentially, the court's position was that it could consider any
argument necessary to making a decision in the case.
In its decision in Mueller II, the Tax Court found that the statute that
precluded jurisdiction over other tax years166 did not bar the application of
equitable recoupment.1 67 Instead, the court focused on whether it had equity
jurisdiction. It is not surprising that the court was reluctant to hold that it
simply did not have the equitable power to consider the equitable recoupment
argument. Easing into its holding that the court had jurisdiction over an
equitable recoupment claim, the Tax Court in Mueller II referred to equitable
recoupment as having "developed concurrently at common law and in
equity, ,16 1 citing a commentator who has been noted for his singularity in
disputing recoupment's origins in equity.169 In fact, at common law, recoupment
was narrowly applied to allow the defendant to reduce the amount owed to the
plaintiff by prior payment or recovery with respect to the same claim.17 ° In
addition, even then, "[t]he defense of recoupment was an innovation upon, or
departure from, the strict rules of law, sanctioned by the courts for the purpose
of doing equity between parties, where it could not be otherwise attained, or not
without a circuitous and expensive process.' 17 1
Judge Chabot dissented in Mueller I, stating:
The majority do not reveal to us where in subtitle B,
or anywhere else in the Internal Revenue Code, is the element
of petitioner's tax that might be affected by possible
application of equitable recoupment. Obviously, equitable
recoupment does not affect the amount shown as the tax on the
taxpayer's tax return. It appears that the doctrine of equitable
recoupment does not affect what we have already described as
the "sole issue for decision" in the instant case, or any other
element of the Internal Revenue Code that is to be taken into
account in determining the amount of any deficiency in the
instant case....

165. Id. at 556.
166. See IRC § 6214.
167. Estate ofMueller, 101 T.C. at 561.
168. Id. at 552 (citing McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal Taxation,
28 Va. L. Rev. 577, 579-581 (1942)).
169. Lynch, supra note 146, at 111 n.297 ("Unlike others who define this doctrine, Mr.
McConnell disputes that its nature is equitable.").
170. Thomas W. Waterman, A Treatise on the Law of Set-Off, Recoupment, and
Counter-Claim, §§ 455-460, at 476-480 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1872).
171. Id. § 421, at 469.
172. Estate of Mueller, 101 T.C. at 566 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Judge Chabot made the valid point that the application of equitable
recoupment would neither affect the amount of deficiency nor result in an
overpayment for the tax year,173 the linchpins ofthe Tax Court's subject matter
jurisdiction in a tax deficiency case. 74
In Mueller III, the Tax Court considered the actual application of
equitable recoupment principles to the case, The court held that because
equitable recoupment may only be used as a defense, and because, based on its
valuation of the shares of the Mueller Company,' 75 the estate was entitled to an
overpayment of estate tax, the doctrine did not apply to the case.'76 This holding
rendered Mueller II irrelevant to the ultimate result.'7 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Tax
Court lacked jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment.178 The Sixth Circuit
found that
[A] deficiency redetermination sought in the Tax Court should
not be confused with a refund suit filed in the district court.
Whereas the deficiency redetermination is nothing more than
the judicial review of an assessment made by an administrative
agency, a refund suit is an "action brought to recover a tax
erroneously paid, [which,] although an action at law is
equitable in its function. It is the lineal successor of the
common count indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received."' 79
However, as discussed below, that analysis does not consider the similarities
of the refund suit to the overpayment suit in Tax Court.180
Subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's adverse holding in Mueller, the Tax
Court nonetheless applied equitable recoupment in three cases, Estate of
Bartels v. Commissioner,' appealable to the Seventh Circuit, Estate of
Branson v. Commissioner,8 2 appealable to the Ninth Circuit, and Estate of
Orenstein v. Commissioner,183 appealable to the Eleventh Circuit. In two of
173. See id. at 568 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
174. See IRC §§ 6213, 6214(b).
175. See Estate of Mueller, 63 T.C. Memo (CCH) 3,027, T.C. Memo (RIA) 92.284
(1992); supra note 162.
176. Estate of Mueller, 107 T.C. at 199.
177. Prior to its decision in Mueller II, the Tax Court had already valued the Mueller
Company stock at issue. See Estate ofMueller, 63 T.C. Memo (CCH) 3,027, T.C. Memo (RIA)
92,284 (1992). It was that valuation, coupled with the IRS's allowance in the notice of
deficiency of a credit for tax on prior transfers, that eliminated any deficiency in estate tax, and
in fact entitled the estate to an overpayment. See Estate ofMueller, 107 T.C. at 191-192.
178. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998).
179. Id. at 304 (quoting Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937)).
180. See infra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
181. 106 T.C. 430 (1996).
182. 113 T.C. 6 (1999).
183.79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000).
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these cases, the Tax Court had to address circuit court case law on the issue of
184
equitable recoupment application in the Tax Court; Golsen v. Commissioner
185
point.
in
"squarely
precedent
requires the Tax Court to apply circuit
In Estate of Bartels v. Commissioner,Mr. and Mrs. Bartels had filed
joint income tax returns for their 1981 and 1982 tax years.1 86 In 1990, after the
death of both of the Bartels, the IRS issued notices of deficiency for those
years, and their estates timely petitioned the Tax Court. 187 The estates later
conceded those income tax liabilities. 88 However, Mr. Bartels' estate sought
to recoup a time-barred estate tax overpayment against the income tax
deficiency.
Mr. Bartels' estate had filed an estate tax return on February 21,
1990.' It had reported a total estate tax liability of $3,582,245, which it paid
on February 20 and 21, and which was assessed on April 9, 1990."9° On
November 18, 1991, the IRS assessed a deficiency in estate tax of $94,364, plus
interest of $17,094.88.1" The estate paid both amounts on September 18,
1991.192 On its return, the estate had not claimed any deduction for debts of the
decedent to the IRS for income tax liabilities for the 19 81 and 1982 tax years. 93
Accordingly, on September 14, 1993, the estate filed an amended estate tax
return, claiming additional deductions totaling $267,705.57,94 which resulted
in an overpayment of estate tax of $108,689.'9' Because the estate had filed its
amended return more than three years after its original return, the IRS allowed
the refund claim only to the extent of estate tax paid within two years before the
amended estate tax return was filed ($94,364).196 The IRS thus found that
$14,325 of the estate tax overpayment was barred by the statute of
limitations. 97 The taxpayers asserted in Tax Court that the amount of the
federal income tax deficiencies should be reduced by the time-barred
overpayment of estate tax, under the doctrine of equitable recoupment. 9 8 The
Tax Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the equitable recoupment

184. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff', on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971); cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
185. Id. at 757.
186. Estate ofBartels, 106 T.C. at 431.
187. Id. at 432.
188. Id.
189. Estate ofBartels, 106 T.C. at 432.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 433; IRC § 6511(a).
197. See Estate of Bartels, 106 T.C. at 433.
198. Id.
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argument, and granted the taxpayers' motion.199 In part, the court found that
section 6214(b), which precludes Tax Court consideration of income or gift tax
liability for any year not before the Court, did not preclude the court from
allowing equitable recoupment of the estate tax overpayment against the
20
income tax deficiency.
The facts of Orenstein v. Commissioner °1 parallel those of Estate of
Bartels. The IRS issued notices of deficiency in income tax to the Orensteins
with respect to their 1981 and 1982 tax years.2 2 After Mrs. Orenstein's death
in 1983, Mr. Orenstein petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
income tax deficiency. Mr. Orenstein died in 1993203 and his estate filed a
return that did not reflect a deduction for pending 1981 and 1982 income tax
liabilities. 2 4 In 1998, the taxpayers' estates conceded the income tax
deficiencies. Because a refund of estate taxes based on the deduction of the
income tax liability was time-barred, the estates sought equitable recoupment
of the barred
estate tax overpayment against the conceded income tax
25
deficiency.
In Orenstein, the Tax Court considered ContinentalEquities, Inc. v.
2" 6 in which the Court ofAppeals
Commissioner,
for the Fifth Circuit had stated,
"the conclusion that the 1969 Tax Reform Act [establishing the Tax Court as
an Article I court] did not grant the Tax Court equitable jurisdiction is
inescapable. The courts that have addressed the issue are in agreement without
[sic] conclusion that the Tax Court still does not possess jurisdiction over
equitable claims."2 7 Nonetheless, the Tax Court did not feel bound by
ContinentalEquities, Inc. because of the lack of factual similarity of the two
cases, the intervening passage of two decades during which the understanding
of equitable recoupment had evolved, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Bokum v. Commissioner °8 that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to apply a
different equitable doctrine, equitable estoppel." 9 Thus, in Orenstein, as in
Bartels, the Tax Court allowed recoupment of the otherwise barred estate tax
210
against the income tax deficiencies.
199. Id. at 436.
200. Id. at 435.
201. 79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 551 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1977). Cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, are considered binding precedent within the Eleventh Circuit.
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1lth Cir. 1981).
207. ContinentalEquities,Inc., 551 F.2d at 84.
208. 992 F.2d 1136 (1lth Cir. 1993), aff'g 58 T.C. Memo (CCII) 1183, T.C. Memo
(RIA) 90,021 (1990).
209. Orenstein v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000).
210. See id.
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Estate of Branson presented facts similar to those involved in the
Mueller cases. In Branson, the taxpayer-estate had reported certain date-ofdeath values of the stock in two companies, Savings Bank of Mendocino
County and Bank of Willits. 211 The estate sold some of the shares in each
company at a gain, and distributed the proceeds to the residuary legatee, who
had assumed individual liability for the estate taxes.212 She also reported the
gain on her Federal income tax return and paid the income tax due. 213 The IRS
determined a deficiency in estate tax liability based on higher valuations ofthe
shares in each company.2 14 In a memorandum opinion, the Tax Court
determined date-of-death fair market values that lay between the amounts
asserted by the estate and the IRS. 215 That resulted in a deficiency in estate tax
and an overpayment of income tax on the gains from sale. 216 Refund of the
overpayment of income taxes was barred by the statute of limitations, so the
estate asserted its entitlement to equitable recoupment, based on Estate of
217
Mueller.
In deciding Estate of Branson, the Tax Court considered Mohawk
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,2 8 in which the Ninth Circuit had held that,
under Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., the Board of Tax Appeals lacked
jurisdiction to consider equitable recoupment of income taxes.21 9 The Tax Court
held that Gooch Milling, a case addressing the Board of Tax Appeals (an
executive agency), did not apply to the Tax Court (an Article I court).
Accordingly, it found that the Ninth Circuit lacked precedent squarely on
point. 22' The Tax Court then followed its decision in Mueller II, allowing
recoupment.2 21
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed Estate of
Branson, holding that the Tax Court had the power to apply equitable
recoupment, and that it properly applied it in the Branson case.222 This decision
has created a circuit split with the Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit.223 The
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Bransonhinged on its view that it would be unfair
to taxpayers not to have the option to raise an equitable recoupment claim in
Tax Court, the sole forum not requiring advance payment of litigated taxes. The
211. Estate of Branson, 113 T.C. 6, 6 (1999), aff'd 264 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id. at 7-8.
214. Id. at 9.
215. See Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. Memo (CCH) 78, T.C. Memo
(RIA) 99.231 (1999).
216. Estate ofBranson, 113 T.C. at 9.
217. Id.
218. 148 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1945), aff'g 47 B.T.A. 952 (1942).
219. See id. at 959.
220. Estate of Branson, 113 T.C. at 13.
221. See id. at 36.
222. Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 264 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
223. See Mueller v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Bransoncourt accordingly found a "presumption" of equivalent authority ofthe
Tax Court and the district courts, and held that "[t]o rebut this presumption...
the Commissioner must find specific support in the provisions of the Tax
Code .. . .,2' Because the Ninth Circuit did not find a bar to equitable
recoupment in the Code,"2 it held that the Tax Court may apply equitable
recoupment. This "parallelism fallacy" is debunked below.2 6
The Ninth Circuit discussed Mueller in a footnote. 227 It stated that its
reading of section 6214(b) disagreed with that of the Mueller court. It also
seemed to distinguish Mueller on the ground that the income tax and estate tax
in Mueller related to two different tax years, unlike in Branson.22 8 Apparently,
the Ninth Circuit found significant the fact that in Branson, the estate tax had
been paid in 1992 (though the decedent died in 199 1)' and the income tax year
in question was 1992 (though the income tax was paid in 1993)." The court
stated, "[w]e have no occasion to pass upon the question whether the Tax Court
would have jurisdiction to consider an equitable recoupment claim where the
tax sought to be recouped was from a previous tax year."'" However, this
analysis is flawed because the estate tax is not an annual tax, so it is not
assessed for a particular "tax year." It will be interesting to see whether the
Supreme Court has an opportunity to consider this case.
The opinions in these cases were not without dissenters. Judge Chabot
expressed his belief that the Tax Court lacks equitable recoupment authority.
In his dissent in Estate of Branson, he made the point that "nothing in the
concepts of a 'court', or a 'court of law', makes equitable recoupment an
essential characteristic of a court, or of a court of law. 22 He made a similar
point in Mueller I:

224. Estate of Branson, 113 T.C. at 14.
225. The Branson court correctly stated that § 6214(b) did not apply because it does
not refer to estate taxes. Estate ofBranson, 264 F.3d at 913.
226. See infra notes 301-319 and accompanying text.
227. See Estate ofBranson, 264 F.3d at 913 n.5.
228. Id. ("We also note, however, that in Mueller the taxpayer sought recoupment of
an income tax overpayment that was made in a different tax year from the estate tax deficiency
before the Tax Court."); see also id. at 915 ("In this case, the taxpayer seeks to apply an income
tax overpayment against an estate tax deficiency, both of which occurred in the same year.").
Perhaps the strangest statement the court made in this regard is "[a]ppellee's estate tax deficiency
and consequent income tax overpayment were both paid in the same tax year." Id. at 912. In fact,
the estate tax was paid in 1992, and the income tax with respect to 1992 was paid in 1993. See
Estate ofBranson v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 6, 8-9 (1999). The Ninth Circuit apparentlyhad a
fundamental misunderstanding of the different nature of income taxes and estate taxes.
229. See Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. at 6.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 264 F.3d at 913 n.5.
232. Estate of Branson, 113 T.C. at 46 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
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In the context of considering whether the tax collector
should refund to the taxpayer any specific amount of money
that the taxpayer has paid to the tax collector, there has
developed the concept of equitable recoupment as a doctrine
that affects the "oughtness" of any such refund. Thus, it may
be more productive of understanding to say that equitable
recoupment fits into the refund jurisdiction of certain fora, and
not that those fora have equitable recoupment jurisdiction. "33
However, this approach has not prevailed.
b. Equitable Estoppel.-Equitable estoppel is broader than
equitable recoupment. The application of equitable estoppel prevents one party
from obtaining an advantage over the other party through misleading
conduct. 234 "The application of the doctrine ordinarily involves a decision not
to follow general principles of the tax law because of the equities in a particular
case and therefore courts are cautious in its use. 2'35 Equitable estoppel has four
primary elements:
(1) The first party, with knowledge of the facts, communicates
something to a second party in a misleading way.
(2) The second party reasonably relies on the communication.
(3) The second party would be materially harmed if the first party is
permittedto assert a claim inconsistent with his earlier communication.
(4) The first party should have known that the second party would rely
on the misleading communication.2 36
The Tax Court's use of equitable estoppel reflects the court's
inconsistent approach to equitable doctrines in general. In some cases, the court
applies equitable estoppel without analysis of its jurisdiction to do so. 2 37 In
other cases, the court asserts that it has jurisdiction to apply it,235 and in still
other cases, the court has said that it lacks jurisdiction to apply it.239 Thus, there
is some dispute over whether the Tax Court may use equitable estoppel. "4 °
Equitable estoppel therefore provides a valuable springboard for consideration

233. Estate ofMueller, 101 T.C. at 567-68 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
234. Kennedy, supra note 80, at 624.
235. Dubroff, supra note 62, at 488.
236. Kennedy, supra note 80, at 624.
237. See. e.g., Graffv. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743,760-65 (1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 784
(5th Cir. 1982); Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 25 (1970); Hollman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.
251,260 (1962).
238. See e.g., Orenstein v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000);
Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. Memo (CCH) 86, T.C. Memo (RIA) 88,049 (1988).
239. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 191, 193-94 (1963) (construing
claim as claim for "pseudo-estoppel"); Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141, 164
(1958); see also Dubroff, supra note 62, at 491.
240. See Dubroff, supra note 62, at 492-93.

2001]

Equity and the Article I Court

of the Tax Court's equitable power in the absence of a statute specifically
granting or denying that jurisdiction.
In some Tax Court cases, the court has used equitable estoppel,
particularly against the taxpayer.24 1 In many other cases, it has refused to apply
the doctrine either because one or more of the necessary elements were not
present,24 2 or on the ground that it lacks equity jurisdiction.2 43 The Tax Court
has been somewhat reluctant to apply estoppel against the government, 21 for
reasons that have nothing to do with whether or not it has equitable power;
most courts are hesitant to estop the federal government.245
Some courts seem simply to have assumed without analysis that the
Tax Court has the power to use equitable estoppel.246 By contrast, in Flight
Attendants againstUAL Offsetv. Commissioner,24 7JudgePosner expressly held
that the Tax Court has jurisdiction over equitable estoppel claims, noting that
"[t]he argument that the Tax Court cannot apply the doctrines of equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel because it is a court of limited jurisdiction is
fatuous. All federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
241. See, e.g., Sangers Home for Chronic Patients, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 105
(1979) (taxpayer estopped); Herschlerv. Commissioner, 48 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1475, T.C. Memo
(RIA) 84,569 (1984) (taxpayer estopped); cf. Fredericks v. Commissioner, 126 F.3d 433 (3d
Cir. 1997) (government estopped), rev'g 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) 2998.
242. See, e.g., Hofstetter v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 695, 700 (1992); Kronish v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684 (1988); Boulezv. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209,214-15 (1981); Graff
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743,761 (1980); Schwotzer v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. Memo (CCH)
902, T.C. Memo (RIA) 86,161 (1986).
243. See Dubroff, supra note 62, at 488.
244. See, e.g., Hofstetterv. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 695,700 (1992) (equitable estoppel
isto be applied against the government only "with utmost caution and restraint.") (quoting Estate
of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612, 617 (1977)); Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209,
214-15 (1981) (similarly quoting Emerson), aff'd, 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 896 (1987); Graff, 74 T.C. 743, 761 (1980) ("Although the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is not inapplicable to the Federal Government, it has been applied to such Government
with caution and only where justice and fairplay require it."), aff'd, 673 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1982).
245. See, e.g., Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413,417 (1992) ("This court, along
with several other circuits, allows a private party to assert equitable estoppel against the
government in a very narrow category of cases-when the traditional elements of estoppel are
shown and there is affirmative misconduct on the part ofthe government.") (citing United States
v.Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 911 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1987)); Estate of Carberryv. Commissioner, 933 F.2d
1124, 1127 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The doctrine of estoppel 'is applied against the Government "with
the utmost caution and restraint."') (quoting Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-15
(1981)); see also Heckler v. Community Health Serv. Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (expressly
leaving open the possibility of a flat rule barring any estoppel against the government).
246. See, e.g., Boulez v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 209,218 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987), aff'g 76 T.C. 209, 214-17 (1981); Graffv. Commissioner, 673 F.2d
784,785 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'g 74 T.C. 743,760-65 (1980); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 612, 617-18 (1977).
247. Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
248. Id.
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Other courts have also held that the Tax Court may apply equitable
'
estoppel.2 49
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Tax Court had the "equitable
power to reform the two IRS Forms 872-A that were the subject of the
deficiency determination before it. '21° Similarly, in Mayfair Minerals,Inc. v.
25 1
Commissioner,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that when
the IRS allowed the statute of limitations on assessment to run because of the
taxpayer's misleading returns, equitable estoppel prohibited the taxpayer from
denying that the deductions were properly taken in the earlier years in which
he had taken them.
Relying on the equitable estoppel line of authority, the Sixth Circuit
held, in Reynolds v. Commissioner, that the Tax Court has judicial estoppel
power..2 52 "The judicial estoppel doctrine protects the integrity of the judicial
process by preventing a party from taking a position inconsistent with one
successfully and unequivocally asserted by the same party in a prior
proceeding., 253 It prevents litigant game-playing through repudiation in one
lawsuit of a ground successfully maintained in another lawsuit.2 54 The Reynolds
holding is somewhat surprising, because, as discussed above, it was the Sixth
Circuit in Estate ofMueller2" that reversed the Tax Court's holding that it may
apply equitable recoupment.25 6 However, Mueller involved a statutory bar to
equitable recoupment, as well as Supreme Court authority (with respect to the
258
Board of Tax Appeals); 257 Reynolds did not involve either of these barriers.
c. EquitableInnocentSpouse Relief-CertainInternal Revenue
Code sections expressly authorize the Tax Court to consider equitable
concerns.2 9 For example, after the Supreme Court refused to apply equitable
tolling in a 1997 statute of limitations case,260 Congress amended the statute of
limitations on refund claims to allow equitable tolling of the statute in certain

249. See, e.g., Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 1993)
(dictum) ("If the Tax Court lacked authority to entertain a claim of equitable estoppel...
taxpayers would essentially be denied the right to challenge deficiencies in the Tax Court if they
wanted to assert an equitable estoppel claim. This would be an unfair choice to pose to taxpayers,
and would undermine the purpose of the Tax Court.").
250. Kelley v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1995).
251.456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
252. Reynolds v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1988).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Ogden Martin Systems v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir.
1999); Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1992).
255. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1140 (1999).
256. Id.
257. See id. at 305-306.
258. See generally Reynolds v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988).
259. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
260. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
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situations. 1 Similarly, section 6015, and its predecessor, section 6013(e),
affording an innocent spouse defense to joint and several liability for taxes,- 2
also have equitable elements. Code section 6015(b) provides, in part:
(1) In general. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if(A) ajoint return has been made for a taxable
year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax
attributable to erroneous items of one individual filing thej oint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that
in signing the return he or she did not know, and had no reason to
know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances,it is
inequitableto hold the otherindividualliablefor the deficiency in tax
for such taxable year attributable to such understatement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary
may prescribe) the benefits of this subsection not later than the date
which is 2 years after the date the Secretary has begun collection
activities with respect to the individual making the election, then
the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the
extent such liability is attributable to such understatement.6 3
Statutorily, the Tax Court has jurisdiction over such an innocent spouse
claim,2 4 and therefore must consider the equities of the facts and
circumstances.
The content of subsection (b) of section 6015 contrasts with that of
subsection (f), which provides for innocent spouse relief based on equity:
(f) Equitable relief. Under procedures prescribed by the
Secretary, if(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual under
subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary mayrelieve such individual of such
5
26

liability.

This section arguably reflects the individualized
justice without explicit
2 66
standards that is the hallmark of equity.
261. See IRC § 6511(h).
262. See IRC § 6013(d)(3).
263. IRC § 6015(b)(1) (emphasis added).
264. See IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
265. IRC § 6015(f).
266. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
The IRS quicklyproduced a list ofthe facts and circumstances it considered appropriate
to consider. See Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-5 I.R.B. 447.
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If the Code provides the Tax Court with jurisdiction to consider section
6015(f) claims, then the Tax Court may exercise the discretion provided.
However, the subsection of section 6015 providing the Tax Court with
jurisdiction over innocent spouse claims seemingly does not provide for review
of a denial of section 6015(f) equitable relief:
(e) Petition for review by Tax Court.
(1) In general. hI the case of an individualwho elects
to have subsection (b) or (c) apply(A) In general. The individual may petition the
Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the
267
appropriate relief available to the individual under this section ....
Commentators considering subsection (e) soon after its enactment
generally concluded that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction over denials
of section 6015(f) relief in light of the language italicized above.268
Nonetheless, in three recent cases the Tax Court asserted that it had such
jurisdiction, so long as it was also exercising jurisdiction over a claim under
section 6015(b) or (c).2 69 The Tax Court noted, "where a taxpayer elects to have
either subsection (b) or (c) apply, the taxpayer 'may petition the Tax Court (and
the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief
available to the individual under this section'. ''27° The court found that the
phrase "this section" in section 6015(e)(1)(A) referred to all of section 6015.271
Surprisingly, the IRS quickly acquiesced in the Tax Court's assertion
of jurisdiction over section 6015(f) claims, 27 2 reversing its prior position that
the IRS's determination of whether to afford equitable innocent spouse relief
was not subject to judicial review.273 In fact, it found that the Tax Court has
jurisdiction over section 6015(f) claims regardless of whether the taxpayer has
also claimed relief under subsections (b) or (c), 274 a reading arguably
inconsistent with the language of the statute.2 75

267. IRC § 6015(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
268. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The New Collection Due Process Taxpayer Rights, 86 Tax
Notes 1127,1143 (2000); Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provision:
"Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand?", 80 Tax Notes 835, 849 n.88 (2000); see also Field
Serv. Adv. No. 199929019 (1999), 1999 F.S.A. LEXIS 110.
269. See Charlton v. Commissioner, 114T.C. 333 (2000); Femandezv. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 324 (2000), action on decision, 2000-06 (May 12,2000); Butler v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 276 (2000).
270. Butler, 114 T.C. at 289-90.
271. Id.
272. SeeIRS NoticeN(35)000-338 (June 5,2000), 87 TaxNotes 1612 (June 19,2000).
This Notice was issued about five weeks after the Tax Court's first section 6015(f) decision,
Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000).
273. See, e.g., Field Serv. Adv. No. 199929019 (1999), 1999 F.S.A. LEXIS 110.
274. IRS Notice N(35)000-338 (June 5, 2000), 87 Tax Notes 1612 (June 19, 2000).
275. See IRC § 6015(e)(1).
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IV. TE TAx COURT: DOES IT HAVE EQUITABLE POWERS?
The Tax Court has expressly recognized that it "is a court of limited
jurisdiction, and... may exercise... jurisdiction only to the extent authorized
by Congress. ' 276 Accordingly, as Congress has never specifically granted the
Tax Court equitable powers, 277 one would expect the Tax Court to lack such
powers. And in fact, traditionally, the Tax Court had held that, as a court
created by statute under Article I of the Constitution, it lacks "equity
jurisdiction. 2 11 Moreover, the United States Supreme Courthas statedthat "the
Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable
279
powers."
Nonetheless, as the discussion above demonstrates, over time, the Tax
Court began to make use of equitable doctrines. 280 In fact, in a 1989 decision,
2 81 in support of its decision to apply equitable
Woods v. Commissioner,
principles and reform a Form 872-A, the Tax Court listed numerous doctrines
282
that it had previously applied, and that it considered to be grounded in equity.

276. See Femandezv. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324,328 (2000); Gativ. Commissioner,
113 T.C. 132, 133 (1999); Yuen v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 123, 124 (1999); Bourekis v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 20,24 (1998).
277. As one commentator has noted, "[o]ver six decades have passed since Congress
created the Tax Court, and, as yet, Congress has not authorized equity jurisdiction." Legatzke,
supra note 130, at 894.
278. See, e.g., Estate of Van Winkle v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 994, 999-1000 (1969)
(Tax Court does not have jurisdiction over equitable recoupment claim); Vandenberge v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 321,327-28 (1944) (same), aff'd, 147 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1945); Payson
v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. Memo (CCH) 590, T.C. Memo (RIA) 47,147 (1947) ("Respondent
points out that petitioner seeks to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel and that this Court is
without general equity jurisdiction."); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885,
889 (1989) ("the Court may not 'exercise "general equitable principles" to take jurisdiction over
a matter not provided for by statute."') (quoting Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 726, 787
(1989)); Doner v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1276, T.C. Memo (RIA) 84,528 (1984)
("We are satisfied that we should not... apply the general equitable principle asserted by
petitioner that the Federal government should not be permitted to profit from its mistakes.").
In general, "equity jurisdiction" is a court's power to hear certain civil actions
according to the procedures that were applied in courts of equity, and to resolve them under
equitable rules. Black's Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999).
279. Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987).
280. See, e.g., Estate ofMuellerv. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551,553 (1993) (equitable
recoupment); Orenstein v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1971 (2000) (equitable
estoppel); Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. Memo (CCH) 86, T.C. Memo (RIA) 88,049
(1988) (same).
281. 92 T.C. 776 (1989).
282. See id. at 784 ("we have applied the equity-based principles of waiver, duty of
consistency, estoppel, substantial compliance, abuse of discretion, laches, and the tax benefit
rule.") (footnotes omitted).
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Given the Tax Court's evolution from an executive agency to an Article
I court with increasingly broad jurisdiction,2 83 it may not be surprising that the
Tax Court has sought to take on as many of the powers of an Article HI court
as possible. Of course, the judges of the Tax Court do not all think with one
mind. Recently, Tax Court cases have reflected express disagreement among
the judges of the Tax Court over the extent of the courts equitable powers.284
Yet, a majority of the Tax Court considers the Tax Court to have at least some
equitable power despite the lack of statutory authorization.285 Several Tax Court
judges apparently believe that the Tax Court may exercise the full panoply of
equitable powers. In a concurring opinion in which Judges
Parr, Foley,
286
Vasquez, Thornton, and Marvel joined, Judge Laro stated:
The U.S. Tax Court is a court of law that, like the U.S. District
Courts, has the authority to apply equitable principles such as
equitable recoupment.... I write separately to emphasize the
fact that this Court, although different from District Courts in
a few regards, the most obvious of which is that District
Courts were created under Article III of the U.S. Constitution
whereas this Court was created under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution, is a court of law that has the authority to apply
all of the judicial powers of a District Court.287

283. See supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 6 (1999) (equitable
recoupment case with majority opinion, two concurrences and one dissent); see supra notes 276282 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 280-84; infra note 287 and accompanying text.
Since the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), courts have opined
on their own jurisdiction over matters before them, and asserted jurisdiction over those matters.
Courts generally have been loath to relinquish jurisdiction over cases before them. See, e.g.,
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury:Jurisdictional Self-Dealing In Seminole Tribe, 52 Vand.
L. Rev. 407,408-409 (1999) ("The [Supreme] Court ruled in its own favor each time it decided
an overt question about the federal 'judicial Power' vested by Article III, consistently voting to
fortify the Court's status within the Constitution's structure for the separation of powers, often
at Congress' direct expense.") (footnotes omitted). In that light, the Tax Court's actions are
unsurprising.
286. With the exception of Judge Parr, all of these judges have been appointed since
1993. Judge Parr, appointed in 1985, is the author of the Dorchesterconcurrence expressing the
view that the Tax Court has the power to refuse to enter a bilateral settlement agreement, in the
interest ofjustice. See Dorchester Indus. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 343 (1997) (Parr, J.,
concurring).
287. Estate ofBranson v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 6,41 (1999) (Laro, J., concurring).
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It is undeniable that the Tax Court is a court oflaw.28 It became a court
of law in 1969, when Congress made it a legislative court under Article I ofthe
Constitution.2 89 Yet, not all courts of law are governed by Article I of the
Constitution. As an Article I court, the Tax Court is subject to constitutional
and statutory limitations not applicable to Article III courts. -90 Thus, finding
that the Tax Court is a "court of law" does not resolve whether the Tax Court
has the authority to apply equitable doctrines.
Judge Hamblen has stated, somewhat more modestly, "[w]hile we
cannot expand our jurisdiction through equitable principles, we can apply
equitable principles in the disposition of cases that come within our
jurisdiction.""2 9 This statement was quoted in Judge Beghe's majority opinion
in Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner29 z in which 13 judges joined, including
Judges Parr and Laro.993 Judge Hamblen's statement that the Tax Court cannot
expand its jurisdiction through the use of equity is uncontrovertable. Yet, it
does not determine the issue of what constitutional limits Article I may place
on the Tax Court's use of equity in cases before it.
A court does not acquire jurisdiction by simply asserting that it has
jurisdiction.2 94 Even if a court has applied equitable doctrines without reversal
on appeal, that does not necessarily mean that the court acted constitutionally
or within its jurisdiction. In addition, as discussed above, judges may try to
maximize power through their decisions. 295 Accordingly, assertions in Tax
288. See Freytag,501 U.S. at 888-89 (Tax Courtis a"court oflawv"within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause of Article 1I of the Constitution); cf. Estate ofBranson, 113 T.C. at
41 (1999) (Laro, J., concurring) ("The United States Tax Court is a court of law that, like the
United States District Courts, has the authority to apply equitable principles such as equitable
recoupment."); see also Steven J. Willis, Sixth Circuit Decision on Equitable Recoupment
Criticized, 81 Tax Notes 361, 370 n.52 (1998) ("As an Article I court, the Tax Court is a true
court.").
Surprisingly, before Freytagwas decided, the Second Circuit had held that the Tax
Court was not a court of law but rather an executive agency, at least in part. Samuels, Kramer &
Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1991). Although the Second Circuit recognized "that
Congress intended to establish a 'court' pursuant to its Article I authority," it nonetheless stated
that it did "not find the legislative history to indicate definitively where in our constitutional
scheme Congress intended to place this adjudicatory body." Id. at 991.
289. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730.
290. See Estate ofRosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-18 (1980) ("The
Tax Court has only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by statute. It has no jurisdiction to
exercise the broad common law concept of judicial power invested in courts of general
jurisdiction by Article III of the Constitution.").
291. Berkery v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 259, 270 (1988) (Hamblen, J., concurring).
292. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 557 (1993).
293. See id. at 561.
294. "Acourt cannot write its own jurisdictional ticket." Zerand-Bemal Group v. Cox,
23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E. 2d 721,725
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) ("no matter how 'just' the cause, a court cannot confer jurisdiction upon
itself to correct a perceived wrong.").
295. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Court cases that the Tax Court has equitable power must be considered
skeptically because Tax Court judges may consider it to be in the court's best
interest both to actively expand the Court's jurisdiction and not to surrender
jurisdiction over matters that come before the court.
The Tax Court's actions are consistent with this premise. For example,
decided cases, including those settled after docketing, are entered by the
court. 296 In fact, unlike in District Court, once a taxpayer properly commences
a case in Tax Court, only the court can remove the case from its jurisdiction.
Thus, the Tax Court refuses to allow voluntary dismissal 297 or "removal" to
District Court. 298 Although it rarely does so, the Tax Court may also refuse to
enter as a decision a full concession by one party if that concession is rejected
by the other party, who wants to litigate the case.299 Four Tax Courtjudges have
concurred in the view that the Tax Court may refuse to enter as a decision a
bilateral settlement agreement if the interests of justice require that.3 "0
A. The ParallelismFallacy
Part of what may underlie the Tax Court's assertion of equitable power
is the recognition that the Tax Court sharesjurisdiction with at least two courts,
one of which clearly may apply equitable doctrines in tax cases. The United
States District Courts and Court of Federal Claims may both hear federal tax
cases. The District Courts, having been formed under Article III, have equitable
powers.30' From the perspective of a tax lawyer or a Tax Court judge, it may b&
difficult to see why forum choice may affect the outcome simply because some
courts have equitable powers and others may not.30" Even Judge Posner has
used this approach to uphold Tax Court jurisdiction over equitable estoppel
claims. In FlightAttendants Against UAL Offset,30 3 he stated, "[w]e are given
296. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of
Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 315, 327 n.47 (1999).
297. See Wellman v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. Memo (CCH) 866, T.C. Memo (RIA)
85,097 (1985) ("this Court has no procedure which authorizes or permits a party to unilaterally
withdraw a petition once filed.").
298. Tuckettv. Commissioner, 46 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1413, T.C. Memo (RIA) 86,575
(1983); Donl v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 720, 722 (1972), aff'd, 507 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1974).
299. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 350 (1982) (taxpayer's attempted full
concession reflected in case transcript), aft'd, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished op.);
LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589 (1975). For further discussion of this issue, see
Lederman, supra note 18.
300. See Dorchester Indus. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 343 (1997) (Parr, J.,
concurring). Judge Parr was joined by Judges Chabot, Jacobs, and Laro. Id.
301. See U.S. Const. art. I.The bankruptcy courts also decide tax issues.
302. Cf. Willis, supra note 288, at 368 ("The [Sixth Circuit in Mueller] also did not
deal with the patent unfairness of denying Tax Court equitable jurisdiction -and the silly games
it prompts.").
303. Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1999).
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no reason to suppose that statutes of limitations are intended to be administered
differently in the Tax Court than in the federal district courts, which share
jurisdiction in federal tax cases with the Tax Court."3"
Yet Tax Court and refund court procedures and outcomes often differ
- even with respect to statutes of limitations." 5 That is, there are tax cases that
are timely in one forum but not in another. The Supreme Court's decision in
Commissionerv. Lund 3 0 6 provides an example of this situation. Lundy argued
to the Court that the Court's interpretation of section 6512 would result in a
shorter statute of limitations applicable to his overpayment claim in Tax Court
than in District Court." 7 The Court responded to this argument as follows:
We assume without deciding that Lundy is correct, and that a
different limitations period would apply in district court, but
nonetheless find in this disparity no excuse to change the
limitations scheme that Congress has crafted. The rules
governing litigation in Tax Court differ inmanyways from the
rules governing litigation in the district court and the Court of
Federal Claims. Some of these differences might make the Tax
Court a more favorable forum, while others may not.3"'
The Court pointed out that the "full payment" rule ofthe refund fora30 9 does not
apply in Tax Court, and that in Tax Court the taxpayer is deemed to have filed
310
a refund claim stating the grounds on which he seeks an overpayment of tax;
in the refund courts, undue "variance" from the grounds of the claim may result
in dismissal. 1'
Tax Court and refund court procedures differ in other key ways, as
well. One important example is that the burden of proof in Tax Court
deficiency cases differs from the burden ofproofin refund courts, at least in the
absence of a burden shift under section 7491, as discussed below.' In a Tax
Court deficiency case, the taxpayer need not prove the dollar amount. An
additional difference is that the specifics of the burden of proof in Tax Court

304. Id. at 578 (citations omitted).
305. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
306. 516 U.S. 235 (1996).
307. See id. at 251.
308. Id. at 252.
309. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 13, 17-18
(1940); McDonnell v. United States, 180 F.3d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1999); Charter Co. v. United
States, 971 F.2d 1576,1579 (1 th Cir. 1992); see alsoRegs. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (requiringrefund
claim to state grounds for refund with specificity).
312. See IRC § 7491 (allowing burden ofproofto be shiftedto the IRS in tax litigation
in any forum if the taxpayer meets several prerequisites).
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cases emphasize the notice of deficiency.3 13 Access to the Tax Court in a
deficiency case requires issuance to the taxpayer of a notice of deficiency in
income, estate, or gift tax. 314 No notice of deficiency is required for access to
a refund forum.315
In Tax Court cases in which section 7491 does not apply, the Tax
Court's burden of proof rule provides, in part:
The burden of proof shall be upon the [taxpayer], except as
otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court; and
except that, in respect of any new matter, increases in
deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in the answer, it
shall be upon the [IRS].... 316
New matters and increases in deficiency both refer to matters raised by the IRS
after the notice of deficiency was mailed.317 Code section 6212 prohibits the
IRS from avoiding the effect of this rule by mailing a second notice of
deficiency to a taxpayer for the same tax and tax year with respect to which he
petitioned the Tax Court.318 Because the notice of deficiency is largely
irrelevant in refund litigation, the refund courts provide for no such burden
shift.
Equal access to the Tax Court is not required by the Constitution;
numerous courts have held that there is no due process requirement of access
to a pre-assessment forum. 3 9 Therefore, differences in outcome between
similar cases in the Tax Court and the refund courts, even those resulting from
different procedures in the two courts, are constitutionally permissible.
The facts that different procedures are permissible in Tax Court andthe
federal district courts, and that the differences may result in a different
outcome, suggest that it is constitutionally permissible for equity to be available
in Article III courts and not in the Tax Court. Accordingly, if the Tax Court is
going to apply equitable principles, it must find a specific source of the power
to do so.

313. See Tax Court Rule 142(a).
314. See IRC § 6213.
315. See Lederman and Mazza, supra note 51, at 350.
316. See Tax Court Rule 142(a)(1).
317. See Lederman, supra note 145, at 199, 227.
318. See IRC § 6212(c).
319. See, e.g., Lewin v. Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444,445 (7th Cir. 1978); Brown v.
Lethert, 360 F.2d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1966)" Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760,772 (9th Cir.
1962); Whittemore v. United States, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10243 (N.D. Ohio 1992); see also
Fendlerv. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 1101,1103 (9th Cir. 1971)("Thetaxpayerhas an opportunity
forreviewof his tax liability in the district court, afterpayment, in a refund proceeding .... There
is no denial of due process.").
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B. PossibleSources of Power to Apply Equitable Principles
1. Four Categoriesof Cases.-Casesinvolving the extent of the Tax
Court's equity jurisdiction may be divided into four categories. The first
category reflects an uncontroversial absence of jurisdiction. The Tax Court
itself recognizes that it cannot simply create such things as new deductions or
exclusions from income through the use of equity. 21 Professor Harold Dubroff
aptly terms such taxpayer requests as "pleas for remedial legislation. 32 1 Such
pleas must be directed to Congress, not a court - not even an Article I court.
Courts have no power to enact statutes.
The second category involves a jurisdictional grant by Congress. As
discussed above, in cases in which Congress has expressly granted the Tax
Court authority to do equity, the Tax Court presumptively may do so. That is,
an express statutory grant of equitable power to an Article I court is
presumptively constitutional. The declaratory judgment action available in
certain Tax Court cases3 22 falls in this category. Considering the equities in
providing innocent spouse relief and equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations3" may be additional examples.
The third category, a variation on the second, involves instances in
which the governing statute requires interpretation to ascertain its intent. In
section 6015(e), Congress expressly gave the Tax Court jurisdiction over IRS
denials of relief under section 6015(b) and (c), but was silent as to whether the
320. See Paxman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 567, 576 (1968) (Tax Court could not
authorize an equitable deduction for home improvements to offset gross income from a prize
awarded based on the improvements). The court stated,
[W] e do not regard it as necessaryto discuss the question whether
the allowance of deduction would or would not be equitable, it being our
opinion that it is sufficient to say that not only is the Tax Court not a court
of equity but that petitioners, in effect, are asking us to legislate changes in
the statute as enacted by Congress. The proper forum for a petition or plea
of that kind is Congress. The power to legislate is exclusively the power of
Congress and not of this Court or any other court.
Id. at 576-77.
321. Dubroff, supra note 62, at 483.
322. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985) ("The propriety of issuing a
declaratoryjudgment may depend upon equitable considerations"); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136,155 (1967) ("the declaratoryjudgment and injunctive remedies are equitable innature,
and other equitable defenses may be interposed."); see also Charles A. Rees, Preserved or
Pickled?: The Right to Trial by Jury after the Merger of Law and Equity in Maryland, 26 U. Balt.
L. Rev. 301, 451 (1997) ("Before the merger of Law and Equity, the declaratory judgment was
available at Law as well as in Equity. After merger, the declaratory judgment is difficult to
characterize as being either legal or equitable.") (footnotes omitted).
323. IRC § 6511(h) does not itself mention the words "equity" or "equitable." It is
entitled, "[riunning of periods of limitation suspended while taxpayer is unable to manage
financial affairs due to disability," and provides guidelines for such a suspension. See IRC
§ 6511(h). It is the Supreme Court case that was overruled by § 6511(h) that used the term
"equitable tolling." See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348 (1997).
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court had such jurisdiction over denials of relief under the purely equitable
provision, section 6015 (f).3 24 The IRS and commentators interpreted the statute
to mean that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction over section 6015(f)
claims.325 However, once the Tax Court asserted that it did have such
jurisdiction, the IRS acquiesced.3 26 Yet, the Tax Court does not have
jurisdiction just because it says So.327 The question is whether Congress in fact
authorized the Tax Court to take jurisdiction over equitable innocent spouse
relief. If it did, then, as with category two, the grant presumptively is
constitutionally permissible.
Although the Tax Court's interpretation of section 6015(e) was not the
one reached by initial commentators, and may not have been Congress's intent,
it is a valid reading of an ambiguous statute. However, in one case, the Tax
Court went so far as to amend the taxpayer's petition sua sponte to reassert a
claim for innocent spouse relief under subsections (b) and (c), despite the
taxpayer's concession at trial that she was not eligible for relief under those
subsections.3 28 This seems to go further than Congress intended; it is unlikely
it intended that the Tax Court consider section 6015(f) claims when neither
section 6015(b) or (c) were in issue. Nonetheless, Congress hinged section
6015 jurisdiction on the taxpayer's election of section 6015(b) or (c) relief, not
the taxpayer's maintenance of eligibility for that relief. Thus, the Tax Court's
jurisdictional approach remains within the letter of the statute. There have not
yet been appellate decisions on this issue, and considering the IRS's
acquiescence, there are unlikely to be any anytime soon. In addition, the Tax
Court does have a track record of following its own rule in spite of reversal by
3 29
one Court of Appeals, in cases where appeal lies to another Court ofAppeals.
Once again, reversal of the Tax Court may lie with Congress.
The Tax Court's power to apply such doctrines as equitable estoppel
and equitable recoupment falls in a fourth category. This category reflects
different considerations because the doctrines in question lack governing Code
sections. It is the hardest group of doctrines for which to find authority to apply
equity because the doctrines themselves are not statutory and the Tax Court's
jurisdiction-granting provisions do not expressly provide for equityjurisdiction.
324. See IRC § 6015(e).
325. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 276.
328. Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333,339 n.2 (2000).
329. See, e.g., Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 6, 11 (1999) (applying
equitable recoupment after Sixth Circuit reversal ofMueller); Estate of Bartels v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. 430,433 (1996) (same); Estate of Orenstein v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. Memo (CCH)
1971, T.C. Memo (RIA) 2000-150 (same); Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,757 (1970)
("We shall remain able to foster uniformity by giving effect to our own views in cases appealable
to courts whose views have not yet been expressed"), aff'd, on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
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The best argument might be the historical lineage of tax refund actions, which
may be traced back to the action of indebitatusassumpsit,an action tinged with
330
equity.
2. The Indebitatus AssumpsitAncestry ofTaxRefund Clains.-In1934,
the Supreme Court stated, "the statutes providing for refunds and for suits on
claims therefor proceed on the same equitable principles thatunderlie an action
' In 1937, the Court reiterated that
in assumpsit for money had and received."331
statement,332 and further stated that a tax refund action,
although an action at law, is equitable in its function. It is the
lineal successor of the common count in indebitatus assumpsit
for money had and received. Originally an action for the
recovery of debt, favored because more convenient and
flexible than the common law action of debt, it has been
gradually expanded as a medium for recovery upon every form
of quasi-contractual obligation in which the duty to pay money
is imposed by law, independently of contract, express or
333
implied in fact.
Although the Supreme Court is correct that the modem tax refund
action developed out of the cause of action indebitatus assumpsit and has
equitable aspects, the implication that assumpsit was an equitable cause of
action (that is, cognizable by a court of equity) is misleading. In fact, as is
discussedbelow, indebitatusassumpsitwas actually a common law action with
equitable aspects. 334 According to the Supreme Court, because the tax refund
action has an equitable pedigree, equity is relevant to disputes between
335
taxpayers and the IRS over the taxpayer's correct tax liability.

330. See infra text accompanying notes 397-402.
331. United States v. JeffersonElec. Mg. Co., 291 U.S. 386,402 (1934). The common
count of money had and received was one of several common counts in indebitatusassumpsit.
See Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDictionary ofLaw: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1983,2083 (1985)
("If one could not frame one's pleading so as to allege a sum certain owing to the plaintiff, one
had available the 'common counts,' the most important of which (along with the 'debt' form for
money had and received) were 'quantum meruit' and 'quantum velebant."').
332. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 535 (1937).
333. Id. at 534. In fact, indebitatus assumpsitwas an action at law, not in equity. See
infra notes 388-94 and accompanying text.
334. See infranotes 397-402 and accompanyingtext. Cf. Yung Frank Chiang, Payment
byMistake in English Law, 11 Fla. J. Int'l L. 91, 97-98 (1996) ("In England, an action to recover
payment for money had and received on the ground of mistake is within the jurisdiction of the
court of law. Chancery, the equity court, never dealt with such action unless the plaintiff based
the action on the fraud on the part ofthe defendant or unless the plaintiff, in an insolvency case,
requested the court to distribute assets among claimants.").
335. Stone, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937).
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a. The Tax Refund Action and the Tax Court Overpayment
Claim.-Historically, tax refund actions were suits brought against the tax
collector because, until the Court of Claims was created in 1855, no suit of any
kind against the United States government was permitted in any court.336 To
allow recovery "without seeming to do violence to the sovereign's immunity
'
from suit,"337
in Elliottv. Swartwout,3" an 1836 case regarding customs duties,
the Supreme Court sanctioned suits in assumpsit for money had and received
against tax collectors for taxes collected illegally.339 "There money had been
taken by the collector for duties which were not imposed. This money lawfully
belonged to the plaintiff; it was the duty, therefore, of the collector to pay it
3 40
back to him.
Although this type of suit against the tax collector was soon superseded
in some cases by a statute requiring the duties to be paid over to the Treasury,
and by the resulting administrative procedure,34' in 1866, the Supreme Court
held that the right to sue the tax collector with respect to internal revenue taxes
was implicit in various assessment and collection statutes. 342 That case was also
an action in assumpsit for money had and received.343
The Supreme Court recognized that the suit against the tax collector
was merely a mechanism to afford a remedy against the government.3 " Once
the Court of Claims was created, it afforded a forum for tax suits directly
against the federal government. Yet, as discussed below, Congress and the
courts seemed to deem important District Court jurisdiction over tax refund
actions.
In 1887, Congress passed the Tucker Act, which gave the District
Courts jurisdiction over all claims against the United States for damages up to
$1,000 that were founded upon the Constitution of the United States, any law
of Congress, or any contract with the United States government.345 In 1911, the
limitation on the amount of damages under the Tucker Act was increased to
$10,000.346 In 1915, the Supreme Court held that the Tucker Act included

336. William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue,
60 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1947).
337. Id. at 688.
338. 35 U.S. 137 (1836).
339. Plumb, supra note 336, at 687; see Elliott, 35 U.S. 137 (1836).
340. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 250 (1845).
341. See Plumb, supra note 336, at 689; Cary, 44 U.S. at 251.
342. See Philadelphia v. The Collector, 72 U.S. 720, 730 (1866); Plumb, supra note
336, at 690.
343. Philadelphia v. The Collector, 72 U.S. at 727.
344. See Plumb, supra note 336, at 691; see also George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose,
289 U.S. 373, 383 (1933) (referring to a suit against the tax collector as "merely a remedial
expedient for bringing the Government into court.").
345. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
346. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1093.
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jurisdiction over suits for tax refunds.347 Suits in District Court against the tax
collector remained available for cases involving more than the capped amount.
In 193 5-193 8, for example, suits against the collector comprised about 40% of
tax refund actions brought in District Court.348
In 1921, the Supreme Court held that actions against a tax collector
were personal in nature, and therefore not maintainable against his successor
in office.34 9 Thus, if the collector had died or retired, a taxpayer with a refund
claim of more than $10,000 had no remedy in a District Court. Although the
Claims Court option remained available, the Revenue Act of 1921 preserved
the District Court as a forum by allowing suits against the United States for tax
refunds involving more than $10,000."' 0 In 1954, the $10,000 cap on Tucker
Act claims was eliminated.35'
District Court jurisdiction in refund actions is now embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), 35 z which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent
with the United States Claims Court [United States Court of
Federal Claims], of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the
recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected under the internal-revenue laws.353
The modem-day action grew out of the historic action in indebitatusassumpsit
against the tax collector.
Just as the origins of the modem-day suit directly against the sovereign
for refund of overpaid taxes may be traced to the indebitatusassunpsit action
against the tax collector based on a promise implied in law to refund taxes
collected erroneously, the overpayment suit in Tax Court may be traced to the
same great-grandparents. Congress gave overpaymentjurisdiction to the Board
of Tax Appeals in 1926311 for two reasons: (1) so that the Board would not lose
jurisdiction over a case in which the taxpayer paid the deficiency prior to entry

347. United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28 (1915).
348. Roger J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1393, 1404 n.21 (1938).
349. Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1 (1921).
350. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1310(c), 42 Stat. 311.
351. See Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 1, 68 Stat. 589.
352. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 189 (1960).
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
354. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(e), 44 Stat. 67. The Board of TaxAppeals did
not become a court until 1969. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat.
487, 730.
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of its decision,"' and (2) so that if the taxpayer not only contested the
deficiency but also claimed an overpayment for the same type of tax for the tax
year, litigation in two courts could be avoided.35 6 Initially, the Supreme Court
determined that the Board's overpayment jurisdiction did not allow it to order
a refund after finding that the taxpayer had made an overpayment:
When the determination of overpayment by the Board
becomes final, the statute provides that such amounts shall be
refunded or credited, § 322 (d), and upon the Commissioner's
failure to comply with the statute, a plenary suit will lie in the
district court or the Court of Claims, for the recovery of any
refund to which he is entitled.35 7
The Supreme Court later found that, "the Commissioner may secure a
final adjudication of his right to withhold the overpayment determined by the
Board, on the ground that other taxes are due from the taxpayer, or that upon
other grounds he is not equitably entitled to the refund. 358 Code section
6512(b)(2), which allows the Tax Court to order a refund,359 was enacted in
1988,360 to avoid the necessity of duplicative litigation.
Ifthe Court of Federal Claims has equitable powers over refund actions
in that court, the next question is whether the Tax Court similarly has equitable
powers over overpayment claims. Like the refund courts' jurisdiction over
362
refund claims,3 61 the Tax Court's overpayment jurisdiction is statutory.
Courts have distinguished the two types of courts' jurisdiction, but their focus
on comparing deficiency and refund cases may be misleading. For example, in
Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner,the Sixth Circuit stated:
A deficiency redeterminationsought in the Tax Court should
not be confused with a refund suit filed in the district court.
Whereas the deficiency redetermination is nothing more than
thejudicial review of an assessment made by an administrative
agency, a refund suit is an "action brought to recover a tax

355. See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 42 Alb.
L. Rev. 353,372 (1978). This issue is now specifically resolved by statute. See IRC § 6213(b)(4)
("In any case where [an] amount is paid after the mailing of a notice of deficiency under section
6212, such payment shall not deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction over [the] deficiency
determined under section 6211 .... ").
356. See Dubroff, supra note 355, at 373.
357. United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 542 (1937).
358. Id.
359. See IRC § 6512(b)(2).
360. Pub. L. No. 100-647 § 6244(a).
361. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
362. See IRC § 6512(b).
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erroneously paid, [which] although an action at lav is
equitable in its function. It is the lineal successor of the
common count indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received."363
This statement says nothing about the origins or nature of the
overpayment suit in Tax Court. In fact, overpayment suits function just like
refund suits. The difference is that the Tax Court only has jurisdiction over
overpayment suits in cases in which the IRS has alleged a deficiency." 4 In other
respects, overpayment suits and refund suits are virtually indistinguishable. In
both cases, the taxpayer will have already paid the tax in question.3 65 The
statutory periods of limitation will be the same,3 66 although, primarily as a
result of the lack of necessity
for a refund claim,367 the time periods will not
3 68
time.
same
the
at
run
always
Another apparent, but misleading, difference between the refund courts
and the Tax Court lies in the burden of proof. As discussed above,369 in the
absence of the application of a statutory burden ofproof rule,370 the burdens of
proof have been analyzed differently in the two types of courts.37 1 In refund
courts, the taxpayer bears a two-part burden: proving the government wrong,
and establishing the amount owed him.372 In a deficiency case in Tax Court, the
taxpayer need not prove a dollar amount. The explanation for this distinction
between the burden of proof in refund courts and in Tax Court rests on the
indebitatusassumpsit origins of the refund suit. 373 However, for this purpose,
363. Estate ofMueller, 153 F.3d at304 (emphasis added) (quoting Stone v. White. 301
U.S. 532 (1937)).
364. See IRC § 6512(b). In other words, if the taxpayer simply discovers that he
overpaid his taxes, his only potentially available fora are the District Courts and the Court of
Federal Claims.
365. In refund courts, Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), requires full
payment as a condition of suit. In the Tax Court, an overpayment claim may only be made with
respect to tax already paid. See IRC § 6512.
366. See IRC § 6511.
367. See IRC § 6512(b)(3) (providing time periods that refer to § 6511 and generally
correspond to time period that would be applicable in refund court suits).
368. See Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996). For analysis of the problems
created by the complications of § 6512, particularly with respect to delinquent returns, see, e.g.,
Leandra Lederman, It's Time to Fix the "Traps for the Unwary" in the Refund Statutes, 79 Tax
Notes 1057 (1998); Leandra Lederman, Applying the Refund Statutes to Delinquent Returns, 68
Tax Notes 1639 (1995).
369. See supranote 312 and accompanyingtext, supra notes 316-18 and accompanying
text.
370. See IRC §§ 7454 (burden of proving fraud is on the IRS). 7491 (burden shifts to
IRS when taxpayer meets certain threshold requirements).
371. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v.
Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1970).
373. See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the
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the burden in refund courts should be compared with the burden in
overpayment cases, not the burden in deficiency cases. With respect to
overpayments, the taxpayer does have to prove the amount he overpaid. Thus,
with respect to taxpayer claims of entitlement to a refund, the two types of fora
would seem to have the same requirements.
Thus, overpayment jurisdiction and the ability to order refunds are
statutorily created in the Tax Court, much like the refund actions justiciable in
the District Courts and the Court of Federal Claims are created by statute. As
the discussion above reflects, overpayment suits are modeled after refund suits.
Accordingly, like the refund suit, the overpayment suit may trace its origins
back to the indebitatusassumpsit action.
b. The Quasi-EquitableHistoryofndebitatus Assumpsit-The
term "indebitatus assumpsit" is Latin for "being indebted, he promised,"37' 4
reflecting the idea of an existing indebtedness followed by a promise by the
debtor to the creditor to repay the debt. The assumpsit action developed
because of the common law courts' need for an action that did not suffer from
the constraints of the actions for debt and for covenant. The action for debt
required an exact sum due and quidpro quo.37 5 In addition, "wager of law," in
which the defendant brought to court "oath helpers" who affirmed that no debt
was owed, allowing the defendant to prevail, was available as a defense to
informal (unsealed) contracts.376 The action for covenant would lie for breach
of promise, but only for promises under seal.377
Because of the inflexibility of the actions of debt and covenant, the
Court of Chancery began to countenance actions not allowed in the common
law. 378 In response, the common law courts began to expand the tort action of
trespass, which alleged a wrong done against the peace of the king, into
trespass on the case, in which the king had no special interest. 379 Over time, a
trespass action became available to a plaintiff alleging that the defendant had
not kept his covenant. 380 "By the late fourteenth century, 3the
undertaking,
'assumpsit,' had become the contractual basis for recovery. 81

Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 Hastings L.J. 239, 262 (1988); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney,
426 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1970).
374. Leff, supra note 331, at 2083.
375. James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The
View from Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 Geo. L.J. 1949, 1950, 1953 (1988).
376. See id. at 1950 n.24; Leff, supra note 331, at 2083.
377. Leff, supra note 331, at 2083.
378. Oldham, supra note 375, at 1953.
379. Id. at 1953-54.
380. Id. at 1955 (quoting Milsom, supra note 96, at 322).
381. Id.
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In 1602, Slade's Case'12 extended the assumpsitaction from failure to
perform an action promised to failure to pay an amount promised.3 83 In effect,
Slade's Case allowed a plaintiff to plead assumpsit "when what had really
happened is that the defendant had received something which he ought to pay
for, but had not in fact promised to do so, either at the time of the transaction
or thereafter."3' The term indebitatus assumpsithas been used to describe the
action permitted in Slade's Case although in fact the term was not used until
1657.385
In 1760, in Moses v. Macferlan, s6 Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice
of the Court of King's Bench,3 87 allowed an action of indebitatusassumpsitfor
money had and received where no contract existed and the plaintiff alleged that
he had made payment by mistake.3 88 This allowed the law to develop so that,
although indebitatus assumpsit required that a promise be alleged,3" 9 the
promise did not need to be proven.3 9 In addition, though indebitatusassumpsit
originally applied only to contracts implied-in-fact, it was later extended to
contracts implied-in-law (or "quasi-contracts"), that is, obligations created by
law, such as taxes.391 Courts addressed the illogic of finding a subsequent
promise in a contract only implied by law by finding that "the law implied a
promise."39 2 This allowed the extension of the indebitatusassumpsit doctrine
to its eventual use to obtain a refund of taxes illegally or erroneously collected.
The common counts in indebitatus assumpsit, which reflected the
nature of the underlying obligation, arose out of standardization of pleading in
the seventeenth century.393 The common counts in indebitatus assumpsit
included money had and received, money paid, quantum meruit and quantum

382. 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602).
383. Oldham, supranote 375, at 1957 (quoting J.H. Baker, An Introductionto English
Legal History 282 (2d ed. 1979)).
384. Leff, supra note 331, at 2083.
385. Chiang, supra note 334, at 97 n.39.

386. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
387. Oldham, supra note 375, at 1949.
388. Chiang, supra note 334, at 97 n.39 (1996); cf. Ramsay v. County of Cliflon, 92
111.225, 228-29 (1879) (refusing to grant bill inequity formistake because "the action at lawfor
money had and received is... a full and complete remedy") (cited in Val D. Ricks, American
Mutual Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58 La. L. Rev. 663, 731
n.361).
389. WilliamA. Keener, Quasi-Contract, ItsNature and Scope, 57,66 (1893); see also
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 250 (1845) ("This promise [to pay] is always charged in the
declaration, and must be so charged in order to maintain the action.").
390. See Oldham, supra note 375, at 1957.
391. J. B Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Har. L. Rev. 53, 63, 65 (1888), (citing
City of London v. Goree, 1 Vent. 298).
392. Keener, supra note 389, at 66.
393. See James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory:
The View from Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 Geo. L.J. 1949, 1957 (1988).
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velebat.394

It is the common count of money had and received
(essentially a debt
396
action.
refund
tax
modem
the
underlies
that
action)
An erroneous link of indebitatusassumpsitto equity apparently arose
from a misinterpretation ofMoses v. Macferlan.397 In that case, Lord Mansfield
found that the plaintiff had the equities on his side, referring to "ties of natural
justice and equity to refund the money,"39 and allowed an indebitatus
assumpsit action for money had and received to lie where no actual contract,
express or implied, existed.3 99 The reference to equity may have caused an
inference that indebitatusassumpsitwas an action available in courts of equity,
rather than courts at law.4"' Thus, American courts have made such statements
as:
According to the modem doctrine, there is no difference at law
or in equity with respect to [the defendant's] liability. The
actionfor money had and received.., is an equitable action,
andis held to lie wherever money has been paid to the use of
another, which, ex equo et bono, he ought to refird. The
defence allowed to this action is equally liberal, every thing
being permitted to be given in evidence ...
which may tend to
destroy or diminish the equity of the plaintiff s claim.4 1
395

However, as Peter Birks has persuasively argued, Lord Mansfield's equity
reference was to Roman aequitas (fairness), not chancery.4 2

394. See supra note 331,at 2083; Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Principle ofUnjust
Enrichment: Comparative Insights into the Law of Restitution, 37 Alberta L. Rev. 1, 18 (1999).
395. See Leff, supra note 331, at 2083.
396. See supranote 179 and accompanyingtext; supranote331 and accompanyingtext.
397. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
398. Id. at 681.
399. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 407,485 n.308 (1999); Ricks, supra note 388, at
731; Chiang, supra note 334, at 103.
400. See Ricks, supra note 388, at 732 n.369.
401. Dupuy v. Johnson, 4 Ky. 562 (1809) (emphasis added); see also Keyes v. First
Nat. Bank, 25 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1928) ("The action of assumpsit for money had and
received is equitable in its essential nature and purpose. It lies for money which ex aequo et bono
the defendant ought to refund."); Ricks, supra note 388, at 732-33.
"Ex aequo et bono" means something like "in fairness and justice." See, e.g., Keyes,
25 F.2d at 694 n.142. Courts tend to use this phrase in connection with determining the
taxpayer's equitable rights in an action in indebitatusassumpsit.See, e.g., Herrmann v. Gleason,
126 F.2d 936, 939 (6th Cir. 1942) ("Where one has in his hands money which, according to the
rules of equity and good conscience, ought to be paid to another, assumpsit is the proper form of
remedy; and if, at the time of commencement of action, a party holds money which, ex aequo et
bono, he ought not to have retained from plaintiffs, they are entitled to recovery.").
402. Peter B.H. Birks, English and Roman Learning in Moses v. Macferlan, 37 Current
Legal Problems 1, 21 (1984).
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The fairness-based "equitable" character of the assumpsit action is
evident in statements in some American decisions. For example, the Tax Court
has stated, "[a]n action in assumpsit for money had and received is equitable
in character and lies, in general, whenever a defendant has received money that
in equity and good conscience he ought to pay to plaintiff."4 3 The Court of
Federal Claims stated, "[a]n action for refund of taxes is essentially governed
by equitable principles ... equity is woven into the warp and woof of a refund
suit... ."" That is, the refund action does have an equity-based flavor. This
analysis arguably might allow equitable defenses such as equitable recoupment
to apply absent a statutory prohibition - though the connection with true equity
is weak. For example, if a taxpayer claimed an income tax overpayment in Tax
Court (after receiving a notice of deficiency for that tax year) and the IRS
responded by raising the specter of a deficiency in gift tax for a barred year,4 "5
the assumpsit line of reasoning might allow the IRS to raise the defense of
equitable recoupment.
Unfortunately, in each of the four recent cases in which the Tax Court
applied equitable recoupment, the taxpayer had not made an overpayment
claim.40 6 The cases were deficiency cases before the Tax Court; overpayments
403. Estate ofMueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551,566 n.2 (1993) (citingBlack's
Law Dictionary 112 (5th ed. 1979)).
Because in an assumpsitaction "the plaintiffmust recover by virtue of a right measured
by equitable standards, it follows that it is open to the defendant to show any state of facts which,
according to those standards, would deny the right... ."Stone, 301 U.S. at 535.
404. Erickson v. United States. 309 F.2d 760, 763 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Cf. Steuerwald v.
Richter, 158 Wis. 597, 604 (1914) (I would not speak ofthe right to moneyhad and received as
an equitable right, nor of the remedy to enforce it, as in its nature equitable, nor the form of the
action as legal; but that the primary right is a creation of equity, the right to enforce it is a legal
right the same as in case of any other legal obligation ... ").
Currently, the rightto a trial byjuryin taxrefimd suits in the District Courts is provided
by statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 2402. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to
ajury trial "in suits at common law." See U.S. Const. amend. VIL The common law referenced
is that of England as of 1791. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935). There is some disagreement over whether the Seventh Amendment protects the right to
trial by jury in a tax refund suit. Compare Beard v. Commissioner, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCI)
50,677, 84 A.F.T.R. 2d 99-5058 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no such right because "no right of
action at common law existed against a sovereign.") with United Statesv. New Mexico, 642 F.2d
397, 401 (10th Cir. 1981) (reviewing legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2402 to find that "the
1954 congressional action is a reaffirmation of the common law recognition of the right to jury
trial."); cf. Wickwire v. Reineke, 275 U.S. 101, 105. However, in neither case did the courts
contrast common law rights with rights in equity.
405. For example, if, in Year 5, a taxpayer timely seeks a refund for Year 2, the
taxpayer's equitable right "ex aequo et bond"to the refimd should be lost if the taxpayer has a
deficiency for Year 1 that is barred by the statute of limitations on assessment. Although the
statute oflimitations on assessment bars the government from pursuing the Year 1 tax deficiency,
the presence of that deficiency would render it inequitable for the taxpayer to collect a refund
from the government.
406. See supra notes 160-233 and accompanying text, (discussing Mueller, Orenstein,
Bartels,and Branson, all deficiency cases).
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arose with respect to related transaction in a barred year only after the Tax
Court had decided the deficiency issues.4 °7 In each case, the taxpayers could not
make an overpayment claim because of the bar of the statute of limitations on
refund claims.4"' Although the Tax Court can consider tax years not before it
in order to redetermine the tax deficiency for the tax year that is before it,4" 9
that is not what the Tax Court did in these cases. The court did not need to
consider other tax years or other taxes in order to compute the amount of the
deficiency in the years before it.410 Therefore, absent jurisdiction over the other
taxes and tax years, it lacked the power to consider the equitable recoupment
claim.
The statute of limitations on refund claims is apparently ajurisdictional
bar; section 6512(b)(1) provides:
Except as provided by paragraph(3) and by section 7463, if
the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further
finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax
for the same taxable year, of gift tax for the same calendar year
or calendar quarter, of estate tax in respect of the taxable estate
of the same decedent,... the Tax Courtshall havejurisdiction
to determine the amount of such overpayment, and such
amount shall, when the decision of the Tax Court has become
final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer.4
Paragraph (3) of section 6512(b) provides limitations on the amount of credit
or refund to be allowed, requiring timeliness in order for any amount to be
refunded or credited.41 2 Accordingly, the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See supra notes 160-233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160-233 and accompanying text; IRC § 6512(b)(3).
See IRC § 6214(a).
See Estate of Mueller, 101 T.C. at 566 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
IRC § 6512(b)(1) (emphasis added).
See IRC § 6512(b)(3). It provides, in relevant part:
(3) No such credit or refund shall be allowed or made of any portion of the
tax unless the Tax Court determines as part of its decision that such portion was paid(A) after the mailing of the notice of deficiency,
(B) within the period which would be applicable under section
6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), if on the date of the mailing of the notice of
deficiency a claim had been filed (whether or not filed) stating the grounds
upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment, or
(C) within the period which would be applicable under section
6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), in respect of any claim for refund fied within the
applicable period specified in section 6511 and before the date of the mailing
of the notice of deficiency(i) which had not been disallowed before that date,
(ii) which had been disallowed before that date and in
respect of which a timely suit for refund could have been
commenced as of that date, or
(iii) in respect of which a suit for refund had been
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consider the merits of the overpayment claim. Without considering the merits,
the Tax Court could not determine whether an overpayment in fact existed.
This result is unfortunate in that (1) a federal District Court wouldhave
the power to consider the taxpayer's equitable recoupment arguments, and (2)
arguably, given the equity-based origins of the overpayment claim, the Tax
Court might have the authority to consider equitable recoupment arguments
made by the government in overpayment cases. The Tax Court's tendency to
"do equity" in difficult cases is understandable, but "hard cases make bad
'
law."413
A solution lies with Congress; it should amend the Tax Court's
jurisdiction-granting statutes to allow recoupment. Absent such an amendment,
Tax Court should not engage in jurisdictional "self help. 414
Application of equitable estoppel orjudicial estoppel is not limited by
statute, unlike equitable recoupment, but its application also is not authorized
by statute, as is equitable tolling, for example.415 In addition, equitable estoppel
and judicial estoppel arguments may be raised in deficiency cases that do not
involve an overpayment claim. Therefore, routine application of these and
similar doctrines depends on finding a source of equitable power outside both
the jurisdictional statutes and the quasi-equitable pedigree of the overpayment
suit.
V. CONCLUSION
The powers ofArticle I courts are necessarily more circumscribed than
those of their cousin courts granted power under Article I. Yet, Article I
courts play a critical role in determining public rights such as the application
of federal tax laws. Therefore, it is important to understand the extent ofArticle
I courts' powers.
The question of the role that equity plays or should play in Article I
courts has received little attention. Article I courts such as the Tax Court were
unaffected by the merger of law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Congress did not grant the Tax Court general or specific
equitable powers when it created the court.4 16 In fact, the Supreme Court has
commenced before that date and within the period specified in
section 6532....
Id.
413. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
414. See Donald Black & M.P. Baumgartner, On Self-Help in Modem Society, in The
Manners and Customs of the Police 193,193 n.3 (Donald Black ed., 1980) ("defining 'self-help'
as a response to offensive behavior in which offended party takes action on his or her own")
(cited in Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,
42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1399 n.15 (1993)).
415. See IRC § 6511(h).
416. See IRC §§ 6511, 6512; cf. supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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stated that the Tax Court lacks equitable power. It is true that the Tax Court has
no general reservoir of equitable powers on which it may draw when it sees fit;
Article I of the Constitution does not provide that, and Congress did not supply
it.417

Nonetheless, the Tax Court has been applying equitable doctrines when
necessary to avoid harsh statutory results. This article has shown that the Tax
Court lacks the authority to apply many of these doctrines. Public choice
insight into judges' maximization of their power may help explain the Tax
Court's application of equity in spite of the strictures of Article I of the
Constitution. In addition, part of the Tax Court's temptation to "do equity" may
result from the specter of outcomes inconsistent with similar cases brought in
district court.41' That is a genuine problem, particularly because the Tax Court
hears about 95% of litigated federal tax cases.419 But the reality is that, when
Congress provided a pre-assessment tax forum, it did not give itjurisdiction coextensive with the jurisdiction of the district courts and the Court of Federal
Claims.420
As tempting as it is to view the three federal tax fora as functionally
indistinguishable (except when forum shopping), that simply is not the case.421
In fact, courts have ruled over and over that due process does not require access
to the Tax Court.422 Due process does not require similar outcomes, either.2 3
It is simply considered the taxpayer's choice whether to seek refuge in the Tax
Court or instead to pursue refund litigation, despite the practical reality that
many people cannot afford to pay the asserted deficiency in full up front.424
Congress may enlarge the Tax Court's equity arsenal simply by
enacting appropriate statutes, subject to the limits on separation of powers.
Congress could also reconstitute the Tax Court as an Article I court.425
Alternatively, Congress could overrule Flora'S426 full-payment rule to provide
increased access to the federal district courts, which, under Article I, may
417. See U.S. Const. art. I; IRC §§ 6511, 6512.
418. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
419. See Lederman, supra note 145, at 185.
420. See IRC §§ 6511, 6512.
421. See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 301-319 and accompanying text.
424. See Flora,357 U.S. at 75 ("It is suggested that apart-payment remedy is necessary
for the benefit of a taxpayer too poor to pay the full amount of the tax. Such an individual is free
to litigate in the Tax Court without any advance payment. Where ... for some... reason a suit
in the District Court seems more desirable, the requirement of full payment may in some instances
work a hardship.").
425. See Geier, supra note 30; cf. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of
the Federal Courts Study Committee 69 (Apr. 2,1990) (suggesting that Congress create an Article
m appellate division of the Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction over most federal tax appeals,
and provide exclusive trial-level jurisdiction in such cases to an Article I division of the court).
426. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 189 (1960).
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exercise the full array of equitable powers.427 Any of those options would
resolve the constitutionally based problem facing the Tax Court when it uses
equitable doctrines to achieve fair outcomes. However, they would not address
the similar situations of other Article I courts. It is time for Congress to act so
that courts such as the Tax Court will not exceed the constitutional limits on
their powers.

427. See U.S. Const. art. 111. § 2, cl. 1 ("Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.. ").
This last option would likely result in some shift of tax case filings from Tax Court to
the District Courts, an occurrence that might not be desired by either forum.

